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WHOSE MONEY IS IT ANYWAY? THE CASE FOR
A MORTALITY DISCOUNT FOR CASH BALANCE




Over the last twenty years, the traditional career-focused employment
model has changed, with employees becoming more transient than ever
before. The likelihood that a particular employee will spend his entire
career with one company and receive a traditional retirement benefit has
steadily decreased. Over this same time period, many employers have
created ERISA defined benefit plans known as cash balance plans. The
plans resemble 401(k) plans in that the employee's benefit is expressed as
an individual, albeit hypothetical, account. These plans have become
popular, for both employees and employers, because of perceived cost
savings; a perception which has resulted in millions of American employee
participants in cash balance plans.
Since employees are likely to leave employment before retirement,
ERISA provides for lump sum distributions of the employee's accrued
benefit to be made when an employee terminates his employment with his
employer. Cash-balance plan lump sum distributions are subject to ERISA
defined benefit rules, which have resulted in litigation affecting millions of
participants. This is because, while cash balance plans state the accrued
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benefit in terms of a hypothetical account balance, ERISA mandates that
the lump sum payment be actuarially equal to an age 65 annuity. How a
hypothetical account balance is translated into a present value amount
equal to an age 65 annuity has been litigated in the courts and regulated by
the Internal Revenue Service without complete satisfaction.
In August 2003, the 7th Circuit decided Berger v. Xerox,' a
controversial case,2  upholding a controversial and confusing rule
concerning qualified cash balance plans; the Internal Revenue Service's
(IRS) "whipsaw" rule. The Court also made another controversial and
confusing ruling, by prohibiting the taking of a mortality discount in the
calculation of early termination lump sum distributions.3
The holding in Berger has raised questions about benefit accrual and
payout that have not been fully answered. It has been more than four years
since Berger was decided, and neither Congress nor the IRS has spoken to
clarify, affirm, or reject the controversial holding in Berger concerning
mortality discount. The conceptual issue of "whipsaw" has been
thoroughly litigated and is now well-settled. Mortality discount has not
been litigated as often; Berger is the only appellate level case that discusses
it. Similarly, much has been said in the academic world concerning
"whipsaw" but little has been said about the necessity of a mortality
discount to more accurately represent an employee's early termination
lump sum entitlement.
Since August 2006, "whipsaw" and cash balance plans may no longer
raise legal questions as they did for the preceding twenty years. On August
17, 2006, President Bush signed the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006
into law. PPA featured drastic changes to ERISA and, in particular, set out
new requirements for cash balance plans. As a result, Congress believes
the thorny problems of "whipsaw" and mortality discount will be
effectively solved for future years. However, Congress's opinion on this
matter could be viewed with skepticism because of the ambiguous
language used in its solution. "Whipsaw" is the more likely of the two
1. Berger v. Xerox Corp. Ret. Income Guarantee Plan, 338 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2003).
2. The Court upheld a $300 million judgment against Xerox. Id. Judge Posner's
opinion in Berger has been criticized for its lack of explicit reasoning and clarification. See
Rosina B. Barker & Kevin P. O'Brien, Berger v. Xerox: Lookingfor Law in All the Wrong
Places, 16 BENEFITS L. J. 5 (2003) (focusing primarily on the "whipsaw" rules and its
associated problems, and exploring, in-depth, the mortality discount question hinted at in
Berger). The opinion has contributed to rising costs to employers in the administration of
their cash balance plans and has allowed employees to receive more money from their
retirement plans than they truly deserve.
3. Berger, 338 F.3d at 764. This decision will be discussed at length later in this
Article, but for now, note that this ruling is confusing because Berger required plans to
calculate lump sum distributions for cash balance plans differently than other defined
benefit pension plans by not permitting the mortality discount.
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issues to have been solved legislatively, as Congress clearly explained its
intent in this matter despite its ambiguous language. Additionally, PPA's
solution to the cash balance lump sum distribution problem operates only
prospectively; any claims made for conduct arising prior to PPA's effective
date will still be litigated. Regardless, mortality discount will still be a
litigated issue after PPA goes into effect because Congress did not discuss
it explicitly. This Article will be helpful in crafting a judicial solution to
the mortality discount problem; at the very least for those payments made
prior to the PPA's effective date and perhaps those made after.
Part II of this Article will analyze the current state of the retirement
plan industry, the historical background of ERISA and qualified retirement
plans, and will conclude with the competing policy choices concerning risk
allocation that have defined the main distinctions between defined benefit
and defined contribution plans. Part II will also introduce and discuss
ERISA-defined accrued benefits, the understanding of which is essential to
comprehending the issues discussed in Berger. Part II also contains an
introduction to traditional defined benefit plans, ERISA-mandated qualified
death benefits for surviving spouses, a discussion of cash balance plans in
general, and the motivation employers have cited in their decisions to adopt
cash balance plans instead of traditional defined benefit pension plans.
The final sections of Part II will analyze one of the most interesting
behavioral aspects of retirement plans: specifically, the rising tendency of
individuals to terminate employment prior to reaching retirement age and
their resulting decisions to elect lump sum distributions. Part II then
analyzes the consequences of electing lump sum distributions and how they
are valued under traditional defined benefit plans. Part II concludes by
discussing lump sum valuation when the employer sponsors a cash balance
plan.
Part III begins the discussion on the topics truly at issue in this Article
with an analysis of Berger. Section A recalls the framework of accrued
benefit analysis, and Sections B and C analyze "whipsaw" and the
mortality discount to determine their status under the accrued benefit
analysis. Discussion of PPA will be limited in Part III, as the main
discussion of PPA will take place in Part V.
After completing an accrued benefit analysis, this Article in Part IV
recommends the affirmation of the IRS "whipsaw" rules, but recommends
the rejection of the 7th Circuit's prohibition against using a mortality
discount in the determination of the amount of lump sum distributions
made to employees who depart before the age of 65. Following these
recommendations would result in more accurate payments to employees
and lower costs for employers. Part V discusses PPA's effect on cash
balance plans, outlines how lump sum distributions will be managed in
2008]
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future years, and describes how this Article's conclusions will assist courts
in deciding cases arising from pre-PPA conduct.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DEFINED BENEFIT WORLD
A. The Current State of the Retirement Industry
Defined benefit plans4 are a major element of the United States
retirement industry, covering roughly 20% of all American workers.5
There are around $1.6 trillion of assets in defined benefit plans, and almost
75% of the Fortune 500 companies have a defined benefit plan.6 Although
defined benefit plans are a force to be reckoned with, the outlook for
defined benefit plans is dire. The number of defined benefit plans is
declining at an ever increasing rate,8 and the recent failure of pension plans
from bankrupt companies, like United Airlines, have put a harsh spotlight
on pension funding issues and whether defined benefit plans still have a
place in the scheme of qualified retirement plans. 9 Since the late 1980s,
cash balance plans have been touted as a cheaper alternative to the
traditional defined benefit pension plan, and many of these traditional
4. A defined benefit plan is a type of retirement plan that guarantees a participant an
annual benefit, which is calculated under the terms of the plan and under the requirements of
ERISA. For an in-depth discussion of defined benefit plans, see infra Part II.D.
5. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE FUNDING RULES FOR EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DEFINED
BENEFIT PLANS AND THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
CORPORATION ("PBGC") 44-48, (Comm. Print 2003) [hereinafter PRESENT LAW] (stating
that "[t]he National Compensation Survey also found that, in 2000, among full-time
employees in the private sector, 42[%] participated in an employer-sponsored defined
contribution plan and 22[%] participated in an employer-sponsored defined benefit plan.
Some employees participated in both."). The Bureau of Labor Statistics also states that 20%
of workers participate in defined benefit plans as of March 2006. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in Private Industry in the
United States, 7 T.2 (2006), http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebsmOO04.pdf.
6. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 469-
70 (2004).
7. Funding Challenge: Keeping Defined Benefit Pension Plans Afloat: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. On Finance, 108th Cong. 37-38 (2003) (statement of Henry
Eickelberg, Staff Vice President for Benefit Programs, General Dynamics Corporation,
representative of the American Benefits Council) (stating that "[t]he total number of defined
benefit plans has decreased from a high of 170,000 in 1985 to 56,405 in 1998 ... and most
analysts believe there are fewer than 50,000 plans in the U.S. today.").
8. Id. at 38.
9. Promises, Ahem; Company Pensions in America, ECONOMIST, May 14, 2005, at 78
(discussing the effects of United Airlines' plan termination on the PBGC and pensions in
general).
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defined benefit plans have converted to cash balance plans.'0 Still, there
are many issues surrounding cash balance and traditional defined benefit
plans that must be resolved in the near future."
B. Historical Background of Qualified Plans and ERISA
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 2 was passed
in 1974 to provide security for "the continued well-being and security of
millions of employees and their dependents [who] are directly affected by
[retirement] plans."' 3 There are two general categories of retirement plans
that are "qualified" under ERISA: defined benefit plans 4 and defined
contribution plans.'" Defined benefit plans are traditionally identified as
pension plans, while most Americans may recognize defined contribution
plans in the form of 401(k) plans. The main distinctions between the two
involve: 1) investment risk allocation, 2) funding, 3) benefit calculation
and payout, and 4) longevity risk.'6
Under defined benefit plans, investment risk is entirely upon the
employer, whereas under defined contribution plans, the investment risk is
squarely upon the shoulders of the employee.'7 Defined benefit plans use
10. Dana M. Muir, Counting the Cash: Disclosure and Cash Balance Plans, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 849, 857-64 (2004).
11. For a discussion of age discrimination, employer asset recovery and cash balance
plans, see Regina T. Jefferson, Striking a Balance in the Cash Balance Plan Debate, 49
BUFF. L. REv. 513 (2001). For another discussion of "whipsaw" and cash balance plans, see
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX REv. 683 (2000). The
Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006, which this Article discusses briefly in Part V, made
many changes to the pension laws, and attempted to fix many of the age discrimination
issues that have plagued cash balance plans since their inception. It remains to be seen
whether Congress's efforts were effective. A full discussion of PPA's cash balance age
discrimination legislation is beyond the scope of this Article, but the relevant PPA section is
§ 701.
12. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the United States Code,
including 29 U.S.C., and the Internal Revenue Code).
13. Id. at § 2(a).
14. ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (2000).
15. ERISA § 3(34).
16. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 458-65. See also 1 JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY,
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS HANDBOOK 11:3 (2007) (discussing the pros and cons of defined
benefit and defined contribution plans).
17. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 458-59 (explaining that investment risk is "the risk
that retirement resources will earn an inadequate rate of return. Defined benefit
arrangements impose investment risk upon the sponsoring employer ...."); see also
PRESENT LAW, supra note 5, at 7 (explaining that "[t]he person who bears the risk of
investment loss with respect to qualified retirement plan assets depends on whether the plan
is a defined benefit plan or a defined contribution plan. In a defined benefit plan ...
[i]nvestment risk is generally on the employer ...."); see generally Daniel Halperin,
Employer-Based Retirement Income-the Ideal, the Possible, and the Reality, 11 ELDER L.J.
2008]
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complex actuarial methods to determine benefits and payouts, but defined
contribution plans usually disburse in a method determined by the plan and
the employee. The timing of the defined contribution plan disbursement is
often at the discretion of the employee.18
ERISA subjects defined benefit plans to intense employer-based
minimum funding requirements, while employees principally fund defined
contribution plans using their own pre-tax dollars, with the employer
periodically contributing additional funds.19 In defined benefit plans, an
employer contributes an actuarially determined amount to a fund each year,
from which plan administrators make payments to employees.
20
Participants are protected from an employer's bad behavior via a complex
set of fiduciary rules that, in the case of a breach, 2' require the breaching
fiduciary to "make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from
each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary
which have been made through the use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary
... .,,22 Defined benefit plan participants are also protected generally from
an employer's inadequate funding contributions and fund investment losses
by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a quasi-
governmental agency that acts as an insurer of pension plans that are
terminated for various reasons.23  Taken together, the fiduciary rules, the
funding rules, and the PBGC generally make retirement income "safer" for
participants because the plan takes on the investment risk, the participant is
37, 61 (2003) (explaining that "[e]mployers have much greater capacity than employees to
absorb the risks associated with investment performance. Besides benefiting from
economies of scale, the employer can average out investment results among cohorts of
retirees, so it need not worry about a temporary market downturn.").
18. Patrick J. Purcell, Cash Balance Plans: Background and Policy Issues, 29 J.
PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 67, 68-69 (2004) (stating that "[tihe worker typically has the
option to receive these funds in the form of a life-long annuity, as a series of fixed payments
over a period of years, or as a lump-sum.").
19. Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 461-62. See also MAMORSKY, supra note 16, at 12:56-66
(discussing the minimum funding standards of ERISA).
20. See MAMORSKY, supra note 16, at 12:56, 12:67.
21. These fiduciary rules include the so-called "Exclusive Benefit" duty, the duty of
prudence, the duty of diversification, the noninurement rule and the prohibited transaction
rules. These rules are found in ERISA § 404(a) and (b), and § 406. An exact explanation of
these fiduciary duties is unnecessary for the purposes of this Article. Let it suffice that, in
general, employers who sponsor defined benefit plans are subject to greater fiduciary duties
than employers who sponsor only defined contribution plans. See infra note 25 and
accompanying text.
22. See ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000).
23. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, SUSAN J. STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 223 (4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter LANGBEIN] (explaining that "some
plans would continue to terminate with insufficient assets to pay promised benefits,
Congress created a government program designed to insure against such defaults."). See
also ERISA § 4002, 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (setting forth the rights and
responsibilities of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation).
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not responsible for the income, and the PBGC insures the plan in case
things go wrong.
Some employees, however, prefer to have the option to make
decisions regarding their own retirement. For these participants, defined
contribution plans are a better fit, but the right to exercise control does not
come without a price. Defined contribution plans receive fewer statutory
protections and no PBGC insurance because the investment decisions and
cash distributions are nominally under the employee's control.24
Employers who sponsor defined contribution plans often can escape much
of their fiduciary responsibility via ERISA § 404(c), which states that if a
plan allows its participants to direct their own investing and exercise
control over their own account, then "no person who is otherwise a
fiduciary shall be liable.., for any loss, or by reason of any breach, which
results from such participant's . . . exercise of control., 25  Defined
contribution plans are attractive to employers because they can avoid much
of the fiduciary responsibility to which they would otherwise be subject.2 6
Defined benefit plans are superior in the eyes of the participant because
there is little risk of loss for which the participant will be held responsible.
Finally, longevity risk is the risk that one will outlive his retirement
assets, resulting in a marked decrease in quality of life. Most traditional
defined benefit plans are specifically designed to ameliorate this risk
through the payment of annuities, while defined contribution plans must be
24. See Regina T. Jefferson, supra note 11, at 516 (explaining that "[a]lthough 401(k)
plans are appealing to employers and employees alike, the use of these plans as primary
rather than supplemental retirement savings vehicles, has serious implications for future
retirees ... [b]ecause, unlike in defined benefit plans, there is neither a minimum guaranteed
benefit nor Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) protection"). See also ERISA §
404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) (2000) (stating that plans allowing employees to control
investments in defined contribution arrangements will have reduced fiduciary duties to
participants).
25. ERISA § 404(c)(2). See also LANGBEIN, supra note 23, at 633 (explaining that "§
404(c) is primarily concerned to redraw the lines of fiduciary responsibility under ERISA §
404(a) to clarify that when the participant conducts his or her own investing, the plan
fiduciaries are not responsible for decisions that the participant or beneficiary 'controls."').
26. There are several other requirements that must be met before the employer is
absolved of fiduciary responsibilities under § 404(c). First, the plan must allow the
employee to exercise sufficient control. This requirement is only met if the participant is
"provided or has the opportunity to obtain sufficient information to make informed
decisions with regard to investment alternatives available under the plan ...." 29 C.F.R. §
2550.404c-l(b)(2)(i)(B) (2006). Second, the plan must provide the participant "an
opportunity to choose, from a broad range of investment alternatives, the manner in which
some or all of the assets in his account are invested." 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(1)(ii)
(2006). See also LANGBEIN, supra note 23, at 634-35 (illustrating in-depth the control and
"broad range" requirements).
2008]
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designed on an individual basis to meet the threat of outliving one's
assets.27
The traditional defined benefit plan will pay an annuity in monthly
installments for the lifetime of the participant or beneficiary. 28  Because
these payments are stretched out over the retiree's remaining life, there is
no need to worry about running out of money. Some defined benefit plans
have an inflation element or cost of living adjustment (COLA) to make
sure the participant's dollars will continue to finance a similar quality of
life, but many do not. Regardless, there is very little longevity risk inherent
to defined benefit plans, at least as far as the participant is concerned.
The exact opposite is true for defined contribution plans. Because
defined contribution plans are generally lump sums kept in employee-
controlled accounts, to which the employee is only entitled to the account
balance, the employee is the true determinant of how the benefits are paid
and how long the assets will last.29 Arguably, the employee is far less
equipped to make investment decisions than an experienced plan
investment advisor. The focus of this Article is specifically on traditional
defined benefit and cash balance plans, but much has been written on the
rise of defined contribution plans.3 °
C. Accrued Benefits under ERISA
For the purposes of this Article, one of the key elements of ERISA is
the notion of the accrued benefit. At its most basic level, an accrued
benefit is the amount to which the employee-participant is entitled, based
on his compensation and his years of service. The accrued benefit is
cryptically defined as the "amount that the plan participant would receive
27. See Jefferson, supra note 11, at 532 ("Life annuities provide protection against
unexpected longevity, and are the most effective method by which individuals can protect
themselves against the risk of outliving their assets.").
28. Id. ("In traditional defined benefit plans, the normal retirement benefit is expressed
as an amount certain, payable at retirement in the form of an annuity.").
29. See PRESENT LAW, supra note 5, at 7 (stating that "[i]n a defined contribution plan,
the benefit the participant is entitled to is the account balance. Thus, the plan participant
bears the risk of investment losses ...."). See also Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 456-57
("Typically the distribution from a defined contribution plan today takes the form of a single
lump sum payout of the employee's account balance rather than an annuity or other periodic
distribution spread over time").
30. See Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans
Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 3-14 (2000) (discussing
defined contribution plans and the emergence of individual responsibility for retirement
planning as an integral part of ERISA policy); Bradley P. Rothman, 401(k) Plans in the
Wake of the Enron Debacle, 54 FLA. L. REv. 921, 929-32 (2002) (outlining the evolution of
defined contribution and 401(k) plans and the role of ERISA).
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annually as a life annuity beginning at the plan's normal retirement age."'"
The normal retirement age for the purpose of private pension plans is 65.32
Most importantly, however, a benefit, once accrued, cannot be taken away
from the participant by his employer.33 Concurrently, a participant cannot
alienate his benefit once it has accrued.34 The issue of what an accrued
benefit is and how it accrues is key to the later discussion of "whipsaw"
and the mortality discount.
Accrued benefits complete the accrual process by becoming "fully
vested," meaning that they cannot be taken away from an employee once
they are earned. Generally, ERISA requires that an employee's accrued
benefit "vest" in the employee after he has completed five years of
service.35 In plain language, the employee's benefits that have accumulated
over his service and have vested become nonforfeitable, meaning that the
employer cannot take the benefits away or replace them arbitrarily.3 6 No
death benefits are required for accrued benefits, and unless otherwise
stated, accrued benefits are forfeited when the participant dies.37
31. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANSWERS TO KEY QUESTIONS
ABOUT PRIVATE PENSIONS 13 (2002) [hereinafter ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANSWERS]. See also
ERISA § 3(23), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23) (2000) (defining an accrued benefit as the benefit
determined under the plan).
32. See ERISA § 3(24) (defining the "normal retirement age" as the later of age 65 or
the 5th anniversary of the participant beginning their participation in the plan).
33. An accrued benefit that has vested and cannot be taken away is known as
"nonforfeitable." ERISA § 3(19). Nonforfeitable benefits must be unconditional, meaning
that receiving the nonforfeitable benefit in the future cannot be conditioned on a
contingency, e.g., a non-compete agreement or further service requirements.
34. This requirement is also known as the "Antialienation Rule" of ERISA § 206(d)(1),
which states that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan
may not be assigned or alienated." ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000).
35. See ERISA § 203(a)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A) (2000). This five-year
vesting period is known colloquially as "cliff vesting," because every dollar of the benefit is
forfeitable until the participant completes five years and then fully vests in all of his
benefits. Plans may elect a longer vesting period, known as graded vesting, in which the
employee vests gradually over a seven year period. ERISA § 203(a)(2)(B). ERISA requires
20% vesting after three years, with an additional 20% accruing every year until the seventh,
at which the employee is fully vested. Id. Graded vesting is uncommon in defined benefit
plans. See LANGBEIN, supra note 23, at 140 (noting that "[c]liff vesting schedules
predominate in defined benefit plans"). Defined contribution plans are now subject to a
shorter vesting period, but this is irrelevant for the purposes of this Article. Id.
36. See ERISA § 203(a)(1). For a discussion of vesting and how it works in general,
see ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANSWERS, supra note 31, at 39-40.
37. See ERISA § 203(3)(A). See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.41 1(a)-4(b)(1)(i) (2005) (stating
that a right is not treated as forfeitable and thus noncompliant with ERISA "merely because
such accrued benefit is forfeitable by the participant to the extent it has not been paid or
distributed to him prior to his death.").
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Accrued benefits must also satisfy the "backloading" provisions of
ERISA. 3' As a matter of policy, ERISA requires that plans not skew
retirement earnings too heavily toward the end of a worker's career, and to
that end, Congress has created different methods for guaranteeing that
retirement earnings are spread more evenly across a working life.3 9 When
discussing and preventing "backloading", cash balance plans follow a rule
called the "133 1/3%" rule.40 In essence, the "133 1/3%" rule requires that
the benefit accrual in a future year of the plan up to the age of 65 cannot
exceed the accrual in the current year--or any year in between the two-by
more than 33 1/3%.41
D. The Traditional Defined Benefit Plan
In the strictest sense, the traditional defined benefit plan could be
more accurately termed a single-employer "final-average-pay" plan
(FAP).42 FAPs are not the only type of defined benefit pension plan, but
they have been the most commonly used. 43  These plans are subject to
ERISA's minimum funding requirements," and are thus under PBGC
protection in case the company goes bankrupt or the plan is otherwise
terminated.45 These plans feature a defined annuity payment to the retired
employee that will provide a constant source of income for the remainder
of the employee's life.46
38. See I.R.C. § 411(b)(1) (2000). Backloading is a technique companies used
regularly before ERISA to heavily skew retirement benefit accrual to the end of the
employee's career. The practical result of backloading was that employees who did not
complete a career with the backloading plan sponsor would receive very little if they left
employment before approaching retirement age. ERISA tempered these backloading rules
considerably.
39. See Barker & O'Brien, supra note 2, at 10.
40. See id. See also DAN M. McGILL, KYLE N. BROWN, JOHN J. HALEY & SYLVESTER J.
SCHIEBER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 312 (8th ed. 2005) ("[A] cash balance plan
most commonly uses the 133 1/3[%] accrual rule, so the increase in pay credits ... cannot
exceed any prior year's accrual by more than a third.").
41. See I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(B) (2000). See also Barker & O'Brien, supra note 2, at 10
(stating that the "133 1/3%" rule, "requires that the rate of benefit accrual in any future year,
measured as the age 65 benefit stated as a percentage of pay, not exceed the rate in the
current year (or any year in between) by more than 33[%]").
42. See MAMORSKY,SUpra note 16, at 11:20.
43. See id. at 11:21 (indicating that "[b]y the late 1970s, final-average-pay plans
became the most common plan for salaried employees.").
44. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-
406, § 302(b), 88 Stat. 829, 869 (1974). These plans are also subject to the same fiduciary
rules discussed earlier in Part II.
45. See id. at § § 4021-22 (containing sections that outline the basics of PBGC coverage
and the single-employer plan benefit guarantee).
46. See MAMORSKY, supra note 16, at 11:20.
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There are two categories of benefit formulae: unit benefit formulas
and flat benefit formulas. 47  A unit benefit formula specifies a unit of
benefit to be awarded to the employee based on years of service.4 8 A flat
benefit formula often specifies a flat percentage of compensation or a flat
yearly benefit accrual. 49  Regardless, the benefit payment is typically
calculated using an equation dependent on the employee's years of service
and compensation. ° While there are other options, the three most common
methods used by defined plans to calculate benefits are:
1. X dollars for each year of benefit service;
2. Y percent of career average compensation for each year of
benefit service; or
3. Z percent of highest consecutive average compensation for
each year of benefit service."
The first option is the simplest calculation, because a participant
receives a specific dollar amount for each year of service. 2 It is also the
clearest example of a flat benefit formula. For example, Employee X is a
soon-to-retire line worker who earns $50,000 per year. For retirement,
Employee X receives $200 per year for each year of service and she has 30
years of service. Upon retirement her annual benefit will be $6,000, or
$500 per month. The benefits of this type of plan are clear: the plan
sponsor and the participant know at all times what the participant's benefit
will be and the costs are easy to calculate and plan for. The main drawback
to this type of benefit accrual is also clear: it ignores the participant's
compensation and-indirectly-the participant's contribution to the
enterprise. 3 Under this plan type, it does not matter whether the employee
is the company's president, earning $125,000 per year, or the near-
retirement line worker earning $50,000 per year. Both will receive an
identical benefit, despite the drastic difference in their responsibilities and
remuneration. This incongruence has probably contributed to making this
47. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 214 (1982)
(indicating that unit benefit formulas are sometimes referred to as "conventional plans", and
flat benefit formulas are sometimes called "pattern plans").
48. Id.
49. See id. (noting that a common rate is between 20% and 40%, regardless of the
period of employment).
50. See MAMORSKY, supra note 16, at 3:6.
51. Id.
52. See MUNNELL, supra note 47, at 214.
53. Many workers near the end of their careers are earning the most they have ever
earned. They have contributed to the enterprise for many years and are thus rewarded with
higher compensation. This sort of plan design is interesting in that it offers equality to all
participants, but the accompanying cost is that an employee's career-long contributions
cannot be individually rewarded.
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type of benefit accrual most popular in plans "where the range of hourly
wage rates among participants is relatively narrow.
54
The second option is an example of a unit benefit formula, in that the
participant is awarded a specified percentage of his career average
compensation for each year of service. 5 For example, Employee Y has 30
years of service credit and retires with a career average annual
compensation of $50,000. The plan states that Employee Y will receive
1% for each year of service. Because Employee Y is awarded a unit
percentage for each year of service, the longer he works the more money he
will receive. In this example, Employee Y would receive 30% of $50,000
as his annual benefit, or $15,000 per year. This is a startlingly different
result than that of Employee X in the prior example, at least from the
employer's perspective.56 In the first example, the employer can make
fairly quick and accurate projections regarding how much the benefits will
cost. The second example is affected heavily by other factors that are
specific to the employee (e.g., the employee's promotions and pay raises)
to come up with the accrued benefit. These additional factors create
significant actuarial costs for employers beyond those they would incur in
the first example.57 Despite these cost considerations, this method has
become fairly common."
Finally, an FAP typically uses the third option in calculating
benefits.5 9  In some ways, the name "final-average-pay" plan is a
misnomer, because the "final average" salary is not always the salary at
retirement. FAP plans are similar to the second example in that both are
unit benefit formulas. Many FAP plans take the average of salary over the
last ten years of service, while others consider the average salary over the
highest three or five consecutive years in the last ten years, or some other
combination. 60  For example, suppose Plan Z's accrued benefit at
retirement is 1.5% of the average of the employee's final five years of
service up to forty years. Assume further that Employee Z's final average
salary for the purposes of the plan is $75,000 and his years of service are
54. See MUNNELL, supra note 47, at 214.
55. Id.
56. The difference is perhaps not quite so alarming in practice, however, because
Employee Y, with a career average salary of $50,000, clearly has made more money in his
lifetime than Employee X. If Employee X were subject to the second option, her amount
would be different than Employee Y because she undoubtedly has some lower-paid years
earlier in her career that would reduce her career average below $50,000.
57. Actuarial costs are important to plans because they use actuarial assumptions to
determine their obligations under the ERISA minimum funding rules of ERISA § 302.
ERISA's funding rules are outside the scope of this Article, but the costs involved in
complying with all of ERISA's standards are clearly a consideration for plan sponsors.
58. See MUNNELL, supra note 47, at 214.
59. See MAMORSKY, supra note 16, at 11:20.
60. Id.
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30. Plan Z would use the following equation to discover Employee X's
benefit: (1.5% x 30) x $75,000. Thus, Employee Z's benefit at retirement
would be $33,750 annually.
FAPs are also subject to ERISA mandates that require minimum
vesting standards for an employee's retirement benefit. 6' Typically, after
five years an employee's accrued benefits become nonforfeitable, and the
employee retains a right to the funds, even if the employee quits or is
terminated by the company.62
Another element of the FAP is an ERISA-mandated death benefit in
the form of a qualified joint-and-survivor annuity (QJSA). 63 Essentially, if
a fully vested retired employee dies, "[j]oint and survivor annuities
guarantee that the plan participant's surviving spouse will continue to
receive payments after the plan participant dies." 64 A QJSA must pay the
surviving spouse an annuity for the rest of her life that is not less than 50%
and not greater than 100% of the benefit payable to the participant while
the participant is alive.65 Spouses can waive the QJSA in favor of another
type of benefit offered by the plan, but there are many requirements
surrounding such a waiver.66 Because the benefit can be waived, it does
not meet the non-forfeiture provisions of ERISA § 203. Importantly, a
QJSA is only implicated where the participant has already begun receiving
payments as a retiree.
Defined benefit plans must also provide annuity payments to surviving
spouses even when the plan participant has died before retirement.6' These
plans are called qualified preretirement survivor annuities (QPSA). 68 The
amount to which a survivor is entitled under a QPSA depends on whether
the participant reached the earliest possible retirement age under the plan,
but suffice it to say that survivors are guaranteed an amount similar to those
with QJSAs: no less than 50% and no greater than 100% of the
participant's accrued benefit. 69 The key difference between QJSAs and
QPSAs is simple: QJSAs apply after a participant has retired and begun
61. See ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). All ERISA-
compliant plans are subject to the requirements discussed in this paragraph, but for the
purposes of this illustration only FAP plans will be discussed. See id. There are also
ERISA-mandated age discrimination requirements, participation requirements, and benefit
limits, but these are not relevant for the purposes of this Article.
62. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing vesting standards).
63. See ERISA § 205(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (2000).
64. See ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANSWERS, supra note 31, at 15.
65. See ERISA § 205(d)(1). See also 2 JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
HANDBOOK 41:54 (2007) (discussing ERISA's requirements for death benefits).
66. See ERISA § 205(c). See also MAMORSKY, supra note 65, at 41:55 (discussing the
waiver of the joint-and-survivor annuity requirement).
67. See ERISA § 205(a)(2).
68. See id.
69. See ERISA § 205(e).
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receiving payments; QPSAs apply before a participant has retired and
received any payments. Regardless, because QJSAs and QPSAs are
inherent to the defined benefit form, they will become important during the
later discussion of "whipsaw" and the mortality discount.7°
While FAPs are no longer the most popular form of retirement plan,
they still cover millions of current and retired employees
7 1 and will be
essential in the discussion of cash balance plans and early termination lump
sums. The FAP will be used in subsequent Parts to illustrate the key
differences between lump sums distributed from traditional defined benefit
plans and the hybrid, but still technically defined benefit, cash balance
plans.
E. Cash Balance Plans in General
Cash balance plans are one of the newest and most popular forms of
defined benefit plans, covering millions of employees nationwide.72 Many
employers have taken their FAPs and other defined benefit plans and
converted them into cash balance plans.73 The first cash balance plan
surfaced in 1985 when one of the predecessors to Bank of America
converted their traditional plan into a cash balance plan.74 Cash balance
plans are somewhat a creation of the financial services market, in that they
were not specifically authorized by any act of Congress. Cash balance
70. QJSAs and QPSAs do not exist in the defined contribution world because there are
no annuities being paid from one general fund like there are in the defined benefit world. If
a participant in a defined contribution plan dies before receiving payments, his surviving
spouse will receive the amount in the participant's account, subject to other ERISA rules.
See ERISA § 205(b)(1)(C)(i).
71. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
72. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CASH BALANCE PLANS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR RETIREMENT INCOME 13 (2000) [hereinafter ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CASH
BALANCE] (noting that about 19% of Fortune 1000 firms sponsor cash balance plans,
covering an estimated 2.1 million active participants.). In 2003, one study showed that
"nearly one third of Fortune 100 companies [had] adopted some form of cash balance plan."
Kevin E. Cahill & Mauricio Soto, How Do Cash Balance Plans Affect the Pension
Landscape?, 14 CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT BOSTON C. 2 (2003).
73. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CASH BALANCE, supra note 72, at 15. Over 60% of the firms
surveyed in 2000 had created their cash balance plans in the past five years, many of whom
did so by converting old defined benefit plans into cash balance plans. Id. at 14-15.
74. See MAMORSKY, supra note 65, at 53:4 (noting that Bank of America believed, "the
ideal pension vehicle to address its needs would be neither a traditional defined benefit plan
nor a traditional defined contribution plan, but instead a new vehicle that combined the best
features of both-and thus the cash balance pension plan was born"). See also LANGBEIN,
supra note 23, at 62 ("The recent trend toward cash balance plans began in 1985, when the
Bank of America replaced its traditional defined benefit plan with a cash balance plan").
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plans, however, are classified as defined benefit plans for the purposes of
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code.75
Many commentators and plan designers have described cash balance
plans as a defined benefit plan that looks and acts like a defined
contribution plan. 6 Plan participants are given hypothetical "accounts," in
which a certain percentage of their earnings are placed every year. 7 In
addition to having a percentage of compensation set aside, participants also
receive interest credits every year for the money in the account. 7' The plan
determines these interest credits with some help from the IRS. The
employee has no access to the account or control over the funds because
the account does not really exist. 79 All of the funds used to pay out benefits
are kept in a trust identical to the trusts set up for other defined benefit
plans, subject to the same ERISA minimum funding rules and PBGC
requirements. The hypothetical account is merely a creation of accounting,
and the employee has no control over the funds in the account until either:
he terminates employment (if the plan permits lump sum distributions)0 or
75. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CASH BALANCE, supra note 72, at 10 (citing Treas. Reg. §
1.401(a)(4)-8(c)(3)(i) (1999) that "[c]ash balance plans are not specifically identified in the
law, but IRS guidance describes a cash balance plan as 'a defined benefit plan that defines
benefits for each employee by reference to the amount of the employee's hypothetical
account balance."').
76. See Muir, supra note 10, at 855-56 (2004) ("As a technical matter, [cash balance]
plans are a subset of [defined benefit] plans because they promise participants a benefit
based on a formula and do not provide actual individual accounts for plan participants.").
See also Patrick J. Purcell, Cash Balance Plans: Background and Policy Issues, 29 J.
PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 67, 71 (2004) (describing the cash benefit plan as a hybrid of
both the defined benefit and defined contribution plan); Zelinsky, supra note 11, at 687
("The common characterization of the cash balance plan is that it is a defined benefit
pension designed to look like a defined contribution arrangement."); LANGBEIN, supra note
23, at 62 ("A cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan that provides a benefit that largely
mimics the account balance of a defined contribution plan.").
77. See Muir, supra note 10, at 856.
78. See MAMORSKY, supra note 65, at 53:10 ("Employees' accounts are also credited
with interest-related credits at a rate specified in the plan. However, this rate is not tied to
the actual investment performance of the plan's assets."); see also I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-
1 C.B. 359 ("An employee's hypothetical account balance is credited with hypothetical
allocations and hypothetical earnings determined under a formula selected by the employer
and set forth in the plan.").
79. See Purcell, supra note 76, at 71 ("[Iln a cash balance plan, these account balances
are merely bookkeeping devices that show the amount that each employee has earned under
the plan. They are not true individual accounts because they are not owned by the plan's
participants.").
80. See ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CASH BALANCE, supra note 72, at 31 ("Cash balance plans
are more likely than traditional defined benefit plans to offer participants the option of
receiving their benefits in a lump sum either at retirement or at termination of
employment.").
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reaches the "normal retirement age," which is defined as the age of 65.81
When an employee terminates employment before the age of 65, in most
cases he is given two options: either leave his accrued benefits in the plan
until the age of 65 and receive annuity payments thereafter, or elect to take
the money out of the plan in the form of a lump sum distribution.
8 2 Most
employees elect the lump sum distribution, which triggers a calculation
required by the Internal Revenue Code.83
Companies cite a variety of reasons for the popularity of cash balance
plans. Some of the most important include: 1) investment risk, 2) lower
costs, 3) portability of benefits and 4) employee understanding. These will
be discussed individually below.
First, investment risk in the context of retirement planning is the risk
that invested resources will be inadequate to cover retirement 
expenses.14
Under a cash balance plan the investment risk is entirely upon the employer
because the employer must follow ERISA's funding guidelines and can
invest the money in the fund accordingly. 5 The employee is guaranteed
interest credits at a certain interest rate for every year of service, so the
employee is indifferent to investment risk. 6 But, with risk comes reward;
if the money in the fund performs better than the guaranteed interest rate,
the employee receives nothing extra and the increased earnings accrue to
the fund.87 However, the reverse is also true; if the fund does poorly, the
81. See ERISA § 3(24), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (2000) (defining the "normal retirement
age" as the later of the age 65 or the 5th anniversary of the participant beginning their
participation in the plan).
82. Jefferson, supra note 11, at 535 (explaining that "defined benefit plans are not
permitted to make distributions to employees while employment continues. Either at
retirement, or at termination of employment, defined benefit plans are permitted to make
payments in the form of lump sum distributions, or in a series of payments over a number of
years"). See also I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(D)(i) (2000).
The term "lump-sum distribution" means the distribution or payment within one
taxable year of the recipient of the balance to the credit of an employee which
becomes payable to the recipient (I) on account of the employee's death, (II)
after the employee attains age 59Y2, (III) on account of the employee's
separation from service, or (IV) after the employee has become disabled.
Id.
83. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tendency of
employees to elect lump sum distributions.
84. See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 458-61.
85. See MAMORSKY, supra note 65, at 53:7.
86. See supra note 78; see also Muir, supra note 10, at 856 ("[A]s with a [defined
benefit] plan, the first tier of investment risk remains on employers because they must fund
the plan sufficiently to pay promised benefits, and make up any difference if the promised
investment returns exceed the actual investment returns.").
87. See Muir, supra note 10, at 856 ("[T]he plan captures any positive difference
between the promised investment return and the actual return.").
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employee does not share in the losses.8 8 For many risk-averse employees,
this is an important feature of cash balance plans and defined benefit plans
in general.
Second, many companies also believe that, over time, cash balance
plans are cheaper than traditional FAPs.s9 Some employers have achieved
cost savings by eliminating subsidized early retirement benefits and
through other benefit manipulation.9" One study found that most employers
who convert traditional defined benefit plans to cash balance plans do
achieve some level of cost savings, but the study also concluded that the
cost savings sometimes became moot because many employers sweeten
their defined contribution plans when the conversion takes place, thus
keeping aggregate retirement costs at almost the same level. 9' Perhaps the
most important concept is that employers believe they will save money via
a hybrid cash balance plan, which is why they adopt them.
Third, because of the lump sum distribution factor that is built into
cash balance plans, these plans are viewed as having more portable
benefits. This means that mobile employees in today's world of transient
employment are not required to leave their retirement funds in the plan, but
can take them and reinvest them as they see fit once they have separated
from the company. 92 The benefits also accrue faster under a cash balance
plan than they do under a traditional plan, thus adding another incentive to
88. See Muir, supra note 10, at 856.
89. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CASH BALANCE, supra note 72, at 18 ("A survey of 100 cash
balance plan sponsors by PricewaterhouseCoopers found that 56[%] of finns expected the
long-term cost of their defined benefit plans to decrease after conversion [to cash balance
plans]").
90. See Muir, supra note 10, at 862-63.
91. KYLE N. BROWN ET AL., THE UNFOLDING OF A PREDICTABLE SURPRISE: A
COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SHIFT FROM TRADITIONAL PENSIONS TO HYBRID PLANS
18-20 (2000), http://www.watsonwyatt.com/us/research/resrender.asp?id=W-326&page=l
(follow "download PDF" hyperlink). There are also ERISA compliance costs associated
with converting from a traditional defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan (as a brief
example, note the notice requirements associated with ERISA § 204(h)). When these are
taken into account in concert with heightened defined contribution benefits, it is quite
possible that plans save much less in the conversion than they anticipated.
92. See ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CASH BALANCE, supra note 72, at 18 ("Firms that adopted
cash balance plans reported that the opportunity for the increased portability of benefits
influenced their decision to adopt such plans. The lump sum benefit distribution feature
common to many cash balance plans allows eligible workers, upon separation, to gain
access to their pension benefit"); see also Jefferson, supra note 11, at 543 ("Proponents of
cash balance plan conversions argue that cash balance plans are responsive to the needs of
younger, more mobile workers who are disadvantaged under the traditional defined benefit
plan model.").
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young workers looking for portable benefits that they can take with them
when they leave.93
Fourth, many employers also believe that because cash balance plans
present benefits to employees in a way that resembles a 401(k) plan,
namely in a lump sum in an individual account, it is easier for employees to
understand the benefits to which they are entitled. Furthermore, it is easier
for employees to see how the benefits grow over time.94 According to the
United States Government Accounting Office report on cash balance
conversions: "Human resource and benefits officials at several firms we
visited said that [traditional] defined benefit plans have been one of the
least understood and least appreciated benefits in a worker's compensation
package." 95 Cash balance plans arguably increase a worker's appreciation
of the plan because it is easier to understand than an archaic formula that
relies so heavily upon averaging late-career compensation. Employees are
arguably most familiar with something that resembles a savings account,
which is one reason 401 (k) and defined contribution plans have become so
popular. A cash balance plan adds increased benefit comprehension among
participants without creating more risk for them. The participants are not
subject to the same risks they face when investing defined contribution
dollars, which is attractive for plan managers and those who have a more
paternalistic view of retirement preparation.
In closing this section, understand that employers have cited all of
these reasons when converting old traditional plans to cash balance plans or
creating cash balance plans from scratch. Cash balance plans have become
an important part of the retirement landscape, and they will not be
disappearing from the scene any time soon. The next section will explore
how the election of early-terminating employees to receive lump sum
distributions instead of annuities under cash balance plans has also become
its own controversial topic.
F. The Early Termination Phenomena
Employees view cash balance plans as an excellent way to increase
portability of benefits because of the availability of lump sum distributions
to those who separate from service to the company before reaching age
93. See Muir, supra note 10, at 861 ("[cash balance] plans tend to be more attractive
than [traditional defined benefit] plans to younger workers with relatively short job tenures
because of the difference in accrual patterns and payment options.").
94. See ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CASH BALANCE, supra note 72, at 19 ("Because benefits
under cash balance plans are expressed as lump sum values rather than retirement age
annuities, employees may better understand and value such plans."); see also BROWN ET AL.,
supra note 91, at 44 (reporting that 96% of employers surveyed believe that cash balance
plans improve employees' appreciation of their retirement plans).
95. See ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CASH BALANCE, supra note 72, at 19.
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65.96 As stated previously, separated employees are generally given two
options: either (1) leave the money in the plan and receive an annuity
payment beginning at the normal retirement age, or (2) receive a single
lump sum payment when leaving the company.97 It has become an
accepted fact that most choose the lump sum distribution.98 Once the
participant has received the payment, he or she is under no obligation to
reinvest the money for their retirement. The money is the participant's to
spend or to save, depending on his or her individual circumstances.
A majority of employees electing a lump sum is not, on its face, a
disconcerting fact, but in practice, this phenomenon is having a negative
effect on retirement planning.99 According to a Health and Retirement
Study conducted between 1992 and 1998, 77.48% of workers who take
lump sum defined benefit distributions request their money in the form of
cash, and do not roll the money over into another investment vehicle. 00
Only 16.8% roll over their lump sum into another investment.'' One
alarming statistic is that 42.1% of the money taken in cash is spent on
current consumption of goods.102
Factors influencing whether a worker elects lump sum distributions
include the worker's age, education, income level, mortality risk, and
marital status. 10 3  Each individual's situation is different, but the fact
remains that many lump sum retirement distributions are used to pay for
current bills, obligations, or merely squandered on luxury items. This
phenomenon is alarming for its implications on our society, especially
considering the impending retirement of the baby boomer generation and
their imperfect retirement planning. For the purposes of this Article, the
important thing to note is that a large number of individuals elect lump sum
96. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 91, at 44.
97. See supra note 82, and accompanying text.
98. See Gary V. Engelhardt, Pre-Retirement Lump-Sum Pension Distributions and
Retirement Income Security: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study, 55 NAT'L.
TAX J. 665, 667-68 (2002).
99. The reasons why separated employees elect lump sum distributions rather than
lifetime annuity payments is a topic beyond the scope of this Article, but much has already
been written on the subject. For such writings, see id.; Michael Hurd et al., An Analysis of
the Choice to Cash Out Pension Rights at Job Change or Retirement (RAND Inst. for Civil
Justice 1998), available at http://www.rand.org/health/centers/archive/dol/papers/DRU-
1979-DOL.pdf (discussing in-depth the factors involved in the choice to take a lump sum
distribution); Leonard E. Burman, Norma B. Coe & William G. Gale, Lump Sum
Distributions from Pension Plans: Recent Evidence and Issues for Policy and Research, 52
NAT'L TAX J. 553, 553-60 (1999).
100. See Englehardt, supra note 98, at 667-68.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See generally Hurd et al., supra note 99.
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distributions and this choice has a controversial impact on the amount in
actual dollars that a participant receives when he or she separates.
G. The Consequences of Electing a Lump Sum Distribution under a
Final-A verage-Pay Plan
Depending upon whether an employee participates in a traditional
FAP or a cash balance plan, the election to receive a lump sum distribution
can have drastically different results. This is most effectively demonstrated
by illustrating how lump sum distributions are calculated under current law
for FAPs as oppose to how they are calculated for cash balance plans. As a
result of this analysis, it will become clear that cash balance plans lack an
important variable in the calculation of lump sum distributions-an
omission that results in employees being paid more money from their
employers than they are entitled to receive.
Many traditional FAP plans have a benefit feature built into the plan
that allows workers to elect a lump sum distribution on retirement or even
on separation from the company. 1°4 An employee who elects a lump sum
distribution under a traditional defined benefit plan is entitled to the present
value in lump sum form of the life annuity to which he or she is entitled at
the age of 65. °5 Section 417(e) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code)
governs lump sum distributions for defined benefit plans. 06 Plans cannot
force a lump sum distribution on a worker unless they are only entitled to a
present value lump sum of $5,000 or less. 0 7 The participant's consent is
required before a company can pay a lump sum for retirement benefits
greater than $5,000.108
When participants elect to receive a lump sum, they are entitled to the
present value of their accrued benefit. Recall from the previous sections
that an accrued benefit is the benefit expressed in terms of an annuity
beginning at age 65. The plan must calculate the participant's entitlement
using § 417(e). Section 417(e) requires, "the present value [of the annuity]
shall not be less than the present value calculated by using the applicable
mortality table and the applicable interest rate."' 9
While the term "present value" is common language for all financial
professionals, the term is not intuitive for those who do not have any
experience with finance. The concept behind the time value of money, and
104. See I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(D)(i) (2000) (defining lump sum distributions for the
purposes of the Internal Revenue Code in general).
105. See I.R.S. Notice 96-8; I.R.C. § 417(e) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
106. See I.R.C. § 417(e) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
107. I.R.C. § 41 l(a)(1 1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
108. Id.
109. I.R.C. § 417(e)(3)(A)(i) (2000).
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its present value in particular, is that a dollar today is worth more than a
dollar tomorrow because of a variety of factors such as inflation and
interest rates."° Thus, if someone is entitled to $100 ten years from now,
the $100 is worth less than it is worth today. At its most basic level,
calculating the present value of a sum involves selecting a certain interest
discount rate to allow for the time between the present and the expected
date of future payment and then using a simple mathematical equation to
"discount" the future payment to what it would be worth in today's
dollars."' In the case of lump sum distributions from pension plans, the
general expected date of future payment is the age of 65, and the discount
rate is defined in the Code.
The applicable interest rate requirement through 2006 is defined in the
Code as "the annual rate of interest on 30-year Treasury securities for the
month before the date of distribution or such other time as the Secretary
may by regulations prescribe.""' 2 Thus, the discount rate used in the lump
sum calculation is rather easy to discover-simply find the annual rate of
interest on 30-year Treasury bonds and plug the number into your discount
equation. For plan years beginning in 2007, however, the applicable
interest rate will be a segmented rate based on a corporate bond yield curve
prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury." 3 This interest rate will likely
be higher, since it is generally accepted that corporate bonds yield greater
returns than simple government Treasury bonds. Regardless of the new
changes to the discounting rules, the applicable interest rate is not difficult
to locate or apply.
110. See STEPHEN A. Ross, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & BRADFORD D. JORDAN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 129 (6th ed. 2003) ("[T]he phrase time value of
money refers to the fact that a dollar in hand today is worth more than a dollar promised at
some time in the future .... The trade-off between money now and money later thus
depends on, among other things, the rate you can earn by investing.").
111. Id. at 138-42 (illustrating how to create simple present value equations).
112. I.R.C. § 417(e)(3)(A)(ii)(I) (2000). After the Pension Protection Act of 2006,
discussed infra note 113, the applicable interest rate is no longer the 30-year Treasury Bond
rate.
113. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 102(a), 120 Stat. 789
(2006). The PPA, discussed infra Part V, made these changes to the applicable interest rate
definition. These changes were scheduled to go into effect for plan years beginning after
2007. According to the PPA:
The term 'corporate bond yield curve' means, with respect to any month, a yield
curve which is prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury for such month and
which reflects the average, for the 24-month period ending with the month
preceding such month, of monthly yields on investment grade corporate bonds
with varying maturities and that are in the top 3 quality levels available.
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 102(a), 120 Stat. 798 (2006)
(creating new ERISA § 303(h)(2)(D)).
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The "applicable mortality table" is referenced in § 417(e)(3) of the
Code, and is "based on the prevailing commissioners' standard table . . .
used to determine reserves for group annuity contracts issued on the date as
of which present value is being determined . . . .",' The prevailing
commissioners' standard table is further defined later in the Code as, "the
most recent commissioners' standard tables prescribed by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, which are permitted to be used in
computing reserves for that type of contract under the insurance laws of at
least 26 States when the contract was issued." 1 5 The applicable mortality
table for § 417(e) valuations can be found specifically in Revenue Ruling
200162.
lI6
The use of the applicable mortality table allows the company to take a
mortality discount to obtain an accurate present value lump sum. Mortality
directly affects the probability that a payment will be made and when it will
be made. Since the probability is no longer in question, it is logical that the
company should be allowed to discount mortality from the present value of
the lump sum. The plan is also making the payment in today's dollars,
while it had been planning all along to pay the amount expected when the
participant turns 65. Mortality also is a factor in how actuaries determine
the amount of payments under a life annuity, and since mortality is no
longer a risk, it should be taken into account when valuing the lump sum.
Additionally, once the payment is made, there is no longer a qualified
joint and survivor annuity or qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity
involved, which is another reason mortality is a significant factor in valuing
lump sums. The plan has experienced a cost for providing the QPSA and
QJSA to the participant, and should be able to recover some of that cost
since the participant's beneficiaries will never need to use the QPSA or
QJSA benefit. It is unclear to anyone but the actuaries what exactly the
costs are for providing QPSA and QJSA benefits. However, across any
large population of employee-participants, the cost is undoubtedly
significant." 7
H. Cash Balance Plan Lump Sum Valuations
Even though cash balance plans are defined benefit plans for the
purposes of the Code and thus under the purview of § 417(e), in practice
lump sums are valued differently under cash balance plans than they are
114. I.R.C. § 417(e)(3)(A)(ii)(I) (2000).
115. I.R.C. § 807(d)(5)(A) (2000).
116. See Rev. Rul. 2001-62, 2001-2 C.B. 632.
117. Ready information on QPSA and QJSA claim occurrences is not available because
each plan's experience will be different. However, it is clear that plans have to account for
the possibility of these claims in determining their funding obligations for each year.
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under traditional pension plans. This disparity has arisen because of
questions over when and how benefits accrue. This controversy has
resulted in the IRS "whipsaw" rules discussed in Berger v. Xerox, and
recently in certain sections of the Pension Protection Act of 2006."' This
will be discussed further in the Article, but for the purposes of general
understanding, it is necessary to see how, under pre-PPA 2006 law, cash
balance lump sum distributions were-and perhaps will be-calculated.
The IRS issued Notice 96-8 in 1996 to eliminate some of the
confusion surrounding cash balance plans. 9 This is the only official IRS
discussion specifically of cash balance lump sum distributions, and no
regulations have been issued. Courts have upheld Notice 96-8, so even
though it has not been codified, it was the state of the law through 2006 and
all cash balance plans have attempted to follow Notice 96-8 to avoid
litigation. 120
Under the pre-PPA rules, when an employee elects a lump sum
distribution from a cash balance plan, a complicated computation must take
place before the employee actually receives a check. The computation
comes directly from Notice 96-8. The calculation requires the plan to
credit the employee's account for interest at the plan's stated interest rate
for every year to the age of 65 regardless of the employee's current age.'
21
As previously discussed, these credits are called "future interest credits"
and for the purposes of lump sum calculations they have been upheld as
accrued benefits even when an employee has not remained with the
company to the age of 65.122 Once the future interest credits have been
credited to the employee's account, theoretically the account then holds the
118. See infra Part V.A-B.
119. I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359.
120. See Berger v. Xerox Corp. Ret. Income Guarantee Plan, 338 F.3d 755 (7th Cir.
2003); Lyons v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. Salaried Employees Ret. Plan, 221 F.3d 1235, 1249-
50 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that if Notice 96-8 had been issued prior to plaintiff's
lump sum distribution it would have probably forced defendants to comply). The Pension
Protection Act of 2006 purports to have changed how cash balance lump sum distributions
are calculated, so under post-PPA law the value of Notice 96-8 is limited. For this Article,
however, it is essential to understand how the "whipsaw" rules applied pre-PPA. Notice 96-
8 still applies to all lump sum payments made prior to PPA's enactment, and are sure to be
litigated over in the next few years.
121. I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-6 I.R.B. 23 ("[T]he balance of the employee's hypothetical
account must be projected to normal retirement age and then the employee must be paid at
least the present value ... of that projected hypothetical account balance.").
122. See Berger, 388 F.3d at 758. The IRS's argument makes logical sense based on the
ERISA definition of an accrued benefit. If an accrued benefit under a defined benefit plan is
defined as the benefit payable in terms of an age 65 annuity, then the employee is at least
entitled to the future interest credits for the monies which he already has in his account.
This definition has been hotly contended, as will be discussed infra, because it is arguable
when the future interest credits actually accrue, and whether they accrue based on the prior
service or whether they should be contingent on future service.
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amount of money that it would have held had the employee left his money
in the account to the age of 65 and began to receive annuity payments. The
lump sum then must be represented as the value of an annuity at age 65
because ERISA requires that the normal retirement benefit for a defined
benefit plan must be "expressed in the form of an annual benefit
commencing at normal retirement age.', 123 The new lump sum must then be
discounted back to the current year, using the applicable interest rate, to
discover the present value of what could be called the employee's "future
lump sum entitlement." Because the IRS requires plans to discount the
future lump sum at the 30-year Treasury Bond Rate, which is usually lower
than the plan's stated interest rate, a startling effect occurs. 24 The practical
result of this calculation, and a source of great controversy, is that in many
cases employees receive a cash amount greater than what is actually stated
in their account balance. The controversy involves determining whether
the future interest credits are an accrued benefit, and if so, when they
accrue.125
For a simple example, suppose Employee X is 45, and has $36,788.95
in his hypothetical account. Employee X takes a job with another firm, and
elects to take his money in a lump sum. Then suppose that the stated
interest rate of the plan is 5% and that the 30-year Treasury Bond Rate is
4%. The future value of the lump sum would be $100,000 ($37,688.95 at
5% per year for 20 years). The employee's actual entitlement would be
$45,638.70 ($100,000 discounted at 4% for 20 years). This represents a
difference of $7,949.75 between the employee's lump sum and the amount
actually in the account. This $7,949.75 is the result of the "whipsaw" and
is the source of great controversy between employers, employees, and the
government. If the 5% future interest credits are not accrued benefits, then
the employee is only entitled to the amount in his hypothetical account.
The true question then is whether the right to a future interest credit accrues
when service has been provided, and monies deposited, into the
hypothetical account. The answer to this question is by no means clear,
even after Congress's attempted solution in PPA 2006. ERISA specifically
prohibits plans from conditioning the receipt of vested future benefits-in
this case the future interest credits-on continued service, but arguably the
123. See I.R.C. § 41 1(a)(7)(A)(i) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see also Esden v. Bank of
Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that "the accrued benefit under a defined
benefit plan must be valued in terms of the annuity that it will yield at normal retirement
age.").
124. I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-6 I.R.B. 23 ("[T]he present value of the employee's
accrued benefit, determined using the § 417(e) applicable interest rate, will generally exceed
the hypothetical account balance.").
125. See Barker & O'Brien, supra note 2, at 6 ("[T]he [Berger] court in effect rewrote
the accrued benefit to include, as an unconditional right, those additional interest earnings
that under the plan's terms were conditional ....").
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employee has only earned an interest credit for the years in which he has
already served, and has not vested in the future interest credits at all. This
conundrum is discussed further below.
Additionally, under current judicial precedent no mortality discount is
allowed in circuits that elect to follow Berger, even though cash balance
plans are defined benefit plans and governed by § 417(e) of the Code.
Even after the PPA was made, it is not clear whether a mortality discount is
permitted, even though § 417(e) seems to demand it. The case for a
mortality discount will be made later in the Article, but for the purposes of
Employee X's entitlement, no mortality discount can be taken under
Berger. 26  Employee X would thus be entitled to $45,638.70. The
following Part will discuss Berger's specific failings without substantial
reference to the new changes rendered by the PPA. The PPA and its
handling of "whipsaw" will be discussed in Part V.
III. BERGER V. XEROX DROPS THE BALL ON CASH BALANCE LUMP SUM
DISTRIBUTIONS
A. The Court's Treatment of Cash Balance Plans in Berger
The Seventh Circuit has been the only court to discuss both the Notice
96-8 "whipsaw" rules and the mortality discount. In deciding Berger,
Judge Posner followed other circuits and upheld the "whipsaw" rules in
Notice 96-8.27 He did not, however, come to the correct conclusion
regarding the mortality discount. Judge Posner's flip dismissal of the
mortality discount stands out as the most glaring error in the Berger
opinion. Opposite of some commentators, this Article argues that under the
then-state of the law, Judge Posner was correct in his analysis of and his
decision to uphold the "whipsaw" rules of Notice 96-8. However, this
Article argues that the Seventh Circuit dropped the ball on the mortality
discount, and that the court's holding concerning the mortality discount
should be overturned, or at the very least not followed in other circuits.
The cash balance plan at issue in Berger had an interesting aspect that
was the main cause of contention between the parties. The defendant
Xerox Corporation had set up a cash balance plan in which terminated
employees who did not elect to take a lump sum distribution were rewarded
with a higher interest rate for future interest credits. 128 Conversely, those
who elected to take a lump sum distribution received future interest credits
but at a lower rate than promised to the other employees.' 29 This incentive
126. See Berger, 338 F.3d at 764.
127. See id. at 762.
128. See Barker & O'Brien, supra note 2, at 6.
129. Id.
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ostensibly allowed Xerox to keep as much money in its trust account as
possible, which helped to keep the company's yearly required contributions
to a minimum, although this motive was not discussed in the opinion. The
dispute arose because employees who elected the lump sum distribution
believed they were entitled to the higher interest rate regardless of whether
they received a lump sum or an annuity. 130 The Seventh Circuit agreed.
Xerox argued that certain future interest credits were not accrued
benefits, and because the credits were not accrued benefits their receipt
could be made conditional upon leaving the hypothetical account balance
in the plan until the age of 65.' The plaintiff argued the opposite,
specifically that future interest credits accrue to the employee when the
original service credits are deposited into the hypothetical account; and that
by not including future interest credits in lump sum distributions, the Xerox
cash balance plan was in violation of ERISA.
132
In reference to "whipsaw" and future interest credits, Judge Posner
was correct in his isolation of the issue, namely, that "the key question...
is whether future interest credits are part of [the employee's] accrued
benefit. If they are, then in determining his pension entitlement . . . the
plan must add the credits to the employee's cash balance account."'
133
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit decided that future interest credits are
accrued benefits and upheld IRS Notice 96-8 as "... an authoritative
interpretation of the applicable statutes and regulations ... 134 Judge
Posner cited the Second Circuit's discussion of IRS Notice 96-8 in Esden v.
Bank of Boston as a primary source for an explanation of Notice 96-8, so it
is helpful to explore some of the reasoning in Esden.
35
In upholding Notice 96-8, Judge Leval of the Esden court relied on the
well-settled doctrine that "an agency's reasonable, consistently held
interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to deference."'136 Judge Leval
stated that even though the IRS's guidance is in the form of a Notice, rather
than new regulations, the Notice, as a "consistent and reasonable
interpretation by the responsible agency is entitled to deference, regardless
of its form of publication.' ' 37 One might have argued that the IRS was not
130. Id.
131. See Berger, 338 F.3d at 761. Remember that it is illegal under ERISA to condition
the receipt of fully vested accrued benefits on anything post-accrual.
132. See id. at 759.
133. Id. at 760. Throughout the opinion Posner interchanged the terms "accrued benefit"
and "entitlement," perhaps as an easier way of thinking of accrued benefits: a true
entitlement for participants because of the nonforfeiture and anti-alienation rules in ERISA.
134. Id. at 762.
135. Id. at 762.
136. Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 168 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting I.N.S. v. Nat'l
Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189-90 (1991)).
137. See id. at 169.
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interpreting its own regulations, especially since cash balance plans were
not specifically legislatively authorized, but Judge Leval was prepared for
this type of argument. Judge Leval went one step beyond deference and
found that the I.R.S. makes the case for future interest credits as accrued
benefits in the regulations. So, Notice 96-8, while entitled to deference, did
nothing more than explain that future interest credits were accrued benefits
under current law. 1
38
All of this discussion of course begs the question, when do benefits
accrue? While Judge Posner and Judge Leval did not directly answer this
question in their respective opinions, their reasoning seems to argue that
future interest credits become accrued benefits when the original service
credits are deposited into the employee's hypothetical account. This is the
only way calling future interest credits an accrued benefit would make
sense. Put a slightly different way, the courts held that the right to receive
future interest on the amount in the account vests when the "principal" is
deposited into the hypothetical account. Every year when a new amount is
added, the right to receive yearly interest through age 65 is attached to the
amount.
To continue the analogy, future interest credits and the hypothetical
account could be likened to a loan that the employee has made to the
employer. 39 For example, suppose that Employee X has $1,000 deposited
into her account this year, with the promise of a 5% interest credit on the
money. Employee X could then be said to have agreed to forgo receiving
money today in exchange for receiving $1,000 plus 5% annual interest in
the future, specifically at age 65. If this is thought of as a loan, with the
interest credits accruing to age 65 acting as the terms, it seems clear that
Employee X's right to the future interest credits vests on the loan date,
regardless of when the plan decides to pay off their debt to Employee X. In
this case, the plan does not have the option to pay off its debt to Employee
X at any time without implicating ERISA provisions, but Employee X can
demand payment in full upon her separation from employment. Although
the arrangement seems to overly favor Employee X, remember that she can
only demand "repayment" of her "loan" when she has left her employment.
As a condition precedent, she must lose or quit her job.
Returning to Berger; in holding that future interest credits are an
accrued benefit, Judge Posner also found that to allow Xerox to make
receipt of interest credits conditional upon leaving the money in the fund
138. Id. at 169-71. Judge Leval looked to Treasury Regulation 1.401(a)(4)-8(c)(3)(ii) for
guidance. The regulation states: "The plan must provide that an employee's accrued
benefit under the plan as of any date is an annuity that is the actuarial equivalent of the
employee's projected hypothetical account as of normal retirement age .... " Id. at 169.
139. As far as the author is aware, he is the only person to liken cash balance accounts to
loans.
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would be inviting participants to "sell their pension entitlement back to the
company cheap, and that is a sale that ERISA prohibits."' 40 In effect,
Posner reasoned that Xerox was attempting to require participants to "sell
back" their accrued benefits in order to receive the accrued benefits-even
though the participants already had accrued benefits which could not be
forfeited under ERISA.1
4 1
Although it appears Judge Posner correctly upheld the "whipsaw"
rules, he did not fare as well with mortality discount. The truly troubling
part of his discussion of mortality is his brevity. In dismissing Xerox's
contention that a mortality discount should be allowed, Judge Posner held
that, because the plan provides for a qualified joint and survivor annuity, if
the participant dies before retirement age "his spouse or other designated
beneficiary steps into his shoes and is entitled to his entire pension benefit,"
so a mortality discount would be improper.142 He writes nothing else
concerning a mortality discount, and it seems that from his quick dismissal
of the argument he may not have considered fully the requirements of
I.R.C. § 417(e) that apply to all defined benefit plans, not just the
traditional model. Posner also seemed to have an incorrect grasp of the
QJSA and QPSA. The spouse does not step into the shoes of the
participant and receive her entire benefit. A QJSA or QPSA entitles the
spouse only to a minimum 50% of the benefit the participant would have
received, a fact Posner seems to have overlooked. Posner also did not
consider whether the QPSA or QJSA annuity death benefit is an accrued
benefit and, if it is, to whom it accrues.
43
Those who have disagreed with Berger or Esden concerning
"whipsaw" or mortality have been vocal in their disagreement. Rosina
Barker and Kevin O'Brien, two prominent ERISA attorneys who were
involved in Berger, published a dissenting commentary in 2003, a few
months after Berger was decided.144  They characterized the Berger
problem as a question of "how 'accrued benefit' may be defined by the
plan-and in the Berger case, redefined by the court."1 45  Barker and
O'Brien do not contest that generally future interest credits are
unconditional and thus accrued benefits, but they do argue that it did not
violate ERISA to have an unconditional element-the guaranteed future
interest credits in the Xerox plan--or a conditional element-the extra one
percent awarded to those who left their money in the plan.
46
140. See Berger, 338 F.3d at 762.
141. Id. (quoting I.R.S. Notice 96-8, "benefits attributable to interest credits are in the
nature of accrued benefits.., and thus, once accrued, must become nonforfeitable").
142. See id. at 764.
143. See infra Part III.B.
144. See Barker & O'Brien, supra note 2.
145. Id. at 9.
146. See id. at 13.
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Barker and O'Brien interpret Notice 96-8 differently than the courts
have, and consequently argue that there are two forms of interest credits
rather than one: unconditional, known as frontloaded, and conditional,
known as backloaded1 47  They further argue that assuming all
unconditional interest credits violate ERISA is a dangerous assumption and
that, if designed correctly, unconditional interest credits can satisfy
ERISA's backloading provisions.141
The simple version of their argument is that conditional interest
credits do not accrue until the actual interest credits are deposited and, thus,
cannot accrue if the money is taken out in an early distribution. 149 They
are, in effect, a bonus to employees based on a choice. The authors rely on
analogies to another section of the Code, § 417(e), which permits adding
additional service credits post-employment when certain requirements are
met. 50 They find no difference between these accruals and conditional
interest credits, and argue that, essentially, "they are additional accruals
contingent on post-employment events."'
' 5
'
The counterargument is that the public policy of ERISA's defined
benefit regime is violated if some employees, by making a choice, could
end up with a greater accrued benefit in the terms of an age 65 annuity than
employees making a different selection.15 1 Subscribing to this
counterargument clearly implicates the policy that two identical
employees-one who elects to take a lump sum distribution and one who
elects to leave the money in the plan-should be entitled to the same
amount in the terms of an age 65 annuity irrespective of their choices. The
holdings in Berger and Esden give credence to this claim. Barker and
O'Brien admit that such a protective policy could have been part of the
court's reasoning, but dismiss that possibility because they find no basis in
ERISA for denying a reward to those who defer their distributions to age65. 153
As an aside, it is useful to remember that this would not be a problem
if the plan in question were a defined contribution plan. Employees would
147. Id. at9-11.
148. Id. For a discussion of backloading standards, see supra notes 31-33; see also
I.R.C. § 41 l(b)(l) (2000).
149. This ignores the fact that the whole account is a fictional way of representing a
traditionally defined benefit plan, one that would require an annuity payment at age 65.
150. See Barker & O'Brien, supra note 2, at 16.
151. See id.
152. If this were a defined contribution situation, the employee would exercise vast
control both over his benefit and its eventual payout. Because employees have no control
over the defined benefit situation, their interests must have greater protections from ERISA,
which is why allowing employees to make these kinds of choices is unattractive.
153. See id. at 16. The reward in this case would be the future interest credits awarded to
the former employee in exchange for the employee's agreement to leave the money in the
plan until age 65.
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retain control over the funds in defined contribution plans and their accrued
benefit would be a direct result of their choices in regard to investments,
tax issues, and length of investment. 154 Defined benefit plans do not have
this characteristic. In many cases, the only choice given to employees
related to a defined benefit plan is whether to take a lump sum distribution
or an annuity. It seems clear that protecting employees by guaranteeing
that they will all receive the same benefit promised in the plan regardless of
their distribution election is sound policy. 55
B. Accrued Benefit Analysis
The final analysis in this section centers upon whether future interest
credits and the mortality discount are accrued benefits. Because much ink
has already been spent in this Article and elsewhere discussing future
interest credits and their status as accrued benefits, discussion here will be
brief. The mortality discount, however, has not been discussed in great
detail. Analysis will show, I believe, that based on the Code and provisions
surrounding defined benefit plans, a mortality discount is not an accrued
benefit to anyone. Because a mortality discount lacks the special status
given to accrued benefits, it is an essential element of any lump sum
distribution calculation for employees electing such a distribution under
cash balance plans. Consequently, either the holding in Berger should be
overturned or other circuits should disregard it on this issue.
1. Future Interest Credits are Accrued Benefits
Even though future interest credits have been discussed at length in
the preceding parts, it is helpful to reiterate that future interest credits are
accrued benefits under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code. Courts
have unanimously upheld IRS Notice 96-8, 56 which states, "benefits
attributable to interest credits are in the nature of accrued benefits ... rather
than ancillary benefits, and thus, once accrued, must become nonforfeitable
.... ,,157 Because these benefits are accrued benefits, "the retirement
benefits payable at normal retirement age are determined by reference to
154. For a discussion of defined contribution plans and their characteristics, see supra
notes 24-26.
155. Cf Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 34, 40 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (stating that it is
Congress' aim to ensure that "to the fullest extent possible that participants who elected
lump sum distributions and participants who elected monthly benefits will be treated
equally").
156. See Berger v. Xerox Corp. Ret. Income Guarantee Plan, 338 F.3d 755, 758 (7th Cir.
2003); see also Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 168 (2d Cir. 2000).
157. I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-6 I.R.B 24.
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the hypothetical account balance as of normal retirement age, including
benefits attributable to interest credits to that age. '' 58
There have been a variety of arguments against recognizing future
interest credits as accrued benefits, with much venom directed toward the
IRS for not being more forthcoming with guidance for "hybrid" cash
balance plans. As an example of the typical sentiment critics express, one
author writes:
The § 417(e) interest rate requirements were designed to protect
participants in traditional pension plans .... The application of
the § 417(e) requirements to hybrid plans was never considered
when the mandatory interest and mortality assumptions were
enacted, and the basic rationale for the creation of the
requirements do not apply to cash balance plans. Participants in
traditional defined benefit plans needed legal protection to ensure
lump-sum distributions represented an appropriate value ... but a
cash balance plan defines the benefit in terms of a lump-sum
amount .... The scarcity of IRS guidance on how the § 417(e)
requirements apply to cash balance plans has resulted in
confusion and conflict, with significant development of the law
by litigation. 159
Such critics make a good point in regard to laws being designed for
traditional pension plans, and perhaps changes should be made through
congressional or administrative action. Courts have uniformly affirmed,
however, that future interest credits are accrued benefits and that the
"whipsaw" calculation is necessary to comply with ERISA.
2. The Pre-retirement Mortality Benefit is not an Accrued Benefit
While interest credits are considered accrued benefits under pre-PPA
law, pre-retirement mortality benefits are not an accrued benefit under
ERISA. The reasoning for this disparity rests upon ERISA's nonforfeiture
requirements, waiver requirements, and the Internal Revenue Code.
Because pre-retirement mortality benefits are not an accrued benefit, a
mortality discount should be taken during the calculation of early
termination lump sum distributions.
ERISA requires two mortality benefits: the qualified pre-retirement
survivor annuity (QPSA) and the qualified joint-and-survivor annuity
(QJSA). 60 The main difference between the two is when they are paid out.
The QPSA is paid out if the participant dies before reaching the normal
retirement age and before receiving payments, while the QJSA is paid out
158. Id.
159. See MCGILL ET AL., supra note 40, at 316.
160. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
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if the participant dies after he has already retired and begun to receive
annuity payments. Although the minimum mandated benefits for each are
identical, QPSAs will generally be smaller because the deceased participant
has not had as many years to accrue benefits.
Since a mortality benefit would be paid to a survivor, the real question
can be phrased: If mortality benefits are accrued benefits, then when and to
whom do they accrue? The answer to this question is that mortality
benefits are not accrued benefits and so they do not accrue to anyone.
Nonetheless, it is helpful to explore this question because it demonstrates
the problems with characterizing the mortality benefit as an accrued
benefit, or simply dismissing it the way the 7th Circuit did in Berger.
Before discussing the compelling reasons for a mortality discount, it is
important to understand how the calculation works and how the numbers
actually come out. While not actuarially correct, the following
hypothetical illustrates the general concept. 161 Assume that Brent is a 35
year-old man who has worked for BIGCO for fifteen years. BIGCO has a
cash balance plan that takes a certain percentage of salary each year and
deposits it into Brent's fictional account. The money in the account is
credited with 5% interest. Brent has $24,000 in his account today. The
question then is: What would his lump sum distribution be if he cashed out
tomorrow?
If Brent decided to cash out the day before PPA 2006 went into effect,
I.R.S. Notice 96-8 obligations would mandate that the money in his
account be extended out thirty periods to the value it would have when
Brent would be 65. The future value of his current account, credited with
annual interest at 5%, would be $103,726.62.162 IRS Notice 96-8 requires
that plans use the "applicable interest rate" from I.R.C. 417(e) to calculate
the present value of the $103,726.62 lump sum in Brent's account. 163 The
plan would clearly prefer to use the same interest rate to discount the sum
that they used to credit it, because this would result in an identical number.
Because of Notice 96-8, however, the plan must use the "applicable interest
rate," which is the rate on 30-year Treasury securities.' 64 If Brent were to
take his lump sum distribution in December 2005, the plan would be
required to use the applicable interest rate for November 2005.165 Thus,
161. An actuarially correct example is beyond the scope of this Article and is necessarily
much more complex than the example given. The assumptions made for this example are
the minimum in order to make the point as clear as possible.
162. $24,000 x (1 +.05)30.
163. I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-6 I.R.B 24.
164. I.R.C. 417(e)(3)(C) (2000) ("The term "applicable interest rate" means the annual
rate of interest on 30-year Treasury securities for the month before the date of distribution or
such other time as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe.").
165. See id.
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Brent's applicable interest rate would be 4.73%. 66 Discounting backwards,
Brent's future value lump sum of $103,726.62 becomes $25,927.29.167
When compared to Brent's actual account balance of $24,000, it is evident
that Brent receives an additional $1,927.29 to his account balance due to
this "whipsaw" calculation. A mortality discount would be taken after this
calculation has been completed.
A mortality calculation relies on carefully compiled tables of statistics
to determine the likelihood that an individual will not die before a certain
age. 168 The "applicable mortality table" for purposes of I.R.C. 417(e) is the
Commissioner's Standard Ordinary table. 169 The mortality table uses a
"cohort" of one million people born during the same year as the participant
to calculate the probability that he or she will live to a certain age. 17  To
calculate the likelihood that Brent will live to age 65 using the prevailing
table,1 7' take the number of people actuarially alive today in Brent's
cohort-987,679.81-and divide that by the expected number of people in
the cohort that will be alive at age 65, which is 903,771.11. This results in
a 91.5% probability that Brent will be alive at age 65.172 The remaining
calculation is simple: multiply Brent's $25,927.29 present value
entitlement by the probability of his survival. This reveals a post-mortality
discount lump sum distribution of $23,724.63. This is the amount to which
Brent is truly entitled. It is important to note that this amount is actually
$275.37 less than the $24,000 in Brent's hypothetical account.
Although the amount may seem trivial, it could be argued that this
$275.37 is a premium returned to the plan for the risk it has taken in
providing a QPSA. More importantly, it should be noted that Brent's true
entitlement is $2,202.66 less than it is under the current methodology the
Seventh Circuit required in Berger.173 This $2,202.66 is tantamount to a
166. I.R.S. Notice 2005-96, 2005-52 I.R.B 1210.
167. $103,726.62 / (1+.0473)0.
168. See 1 WARREN FREEDMAN, RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 1.10 (6th ed.
1990) (stating that premiums to be charged are determined using mortality tables, "which
are tabulated exhibits of the number of survivors and the number of those dying each
subsequent year among a given number of persons taken at various given ages
respectively"). For an interesting historical discussion of how mortality has been turned into
a statistical factor and subsequently used to adjust premiums for mortality risk, see Edward
A. Lew, Mortality Statistics for Life Insurance Underwriting, 43 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 274
(1948).
169. See Rev. Rul. 2001-62, 2001-2 C.B. 632-34. See also I.R.C. 807(d)(5)(A) (2001)
("The term 'prevailing commissioners' standard tables' means, with respect to any contract,
the most recent commissioners' standard tables prescribed by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners ... .
170. Id.
171. See id. at 634.
172. 903771.11 / 987679.81 = 0.915044634.
173. $25,927.29 - $23,724.63 = $2,202.66.
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judicially imposed windfall to the employee. Conversely, it can also be
considered a judicially imposed taking from the employer and other
workers, since the money is paid from the funds the employer has
deposited into the plan. This taking means the plan will have less money
with which to pay its retiring workers, and less money in the fund to
increase in value through investment and interest. 7 4 It is easy to imagine
how much these windfalls add up across the thousands of employees who
elect lump sum distributions. Now that the numbers behind the calculation
have been demonstrated, the legal and statutory case for the mortality
discount must be made.
Simple logic debunks the notion that an accrued mortality benefit
vests and accrues in the plan participant. If this were the case, then the
participant would not be able to elect a lump sum distribution, since doing
so would forfeit an accrued benefit that cannot be forfeited because of
ERISA's anti-alienation and non-forfeiture rules. If mortality were an
accrued benefit, I.R.C. § 417(e) would not require the use of the
"applicable mortality table" in determining a discount when valuing a lump
sum under a defined benefit plan. It also seems clear that a mortality
benefit does not accrue in the plan participant because the participant must
seek the consent of a surviving spouse in order to elect a lump sum. If the
benefit accrued solely to the participant, no consent would be necessary.
Participants cannot have it both ways. If they want the protections and
positive aspects of a defined benefit plan, they have to be subject to the
attendant negative aspects, including a mortality discount. Mortality
discounts are not taken from defined contribution plans because there are
no mortality benefits built in to the formula.
Additionally, when a participant receives a lump sum distribution, it
should be obvious that once the money has been disbursed, the "survivor"
who would receive the money in the event of the participant's death no
longer has any claim to an annuity or a death benefit. The money is the
property of the participant to do with as he desires, devising to his heirs in
whatever ways he sees fit. The spousal beneficiary has no legal claim over
the funds other than via state community property laws. Remember,
however, that a participant electing a lump sum must seek the consent of a
surviving spouse before receiving the lump sum. This makes a better case
for arguing that if the mortality benefit accrues to anyone, it accrues in the
174. Though defined benefit plan funding and the vast problems associated with it-
including premature employee payouts-are beyond the scope of this Article, it is an
important issue that has received a variety of commentaries from economists and legal
scholars. For in-depth treatments of the perils of defined benefit plan funding, see Daniel
Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 65 (1991);
Nicholas J. Brannick, Note, At the Crossroads of Three Codes: How Employers Are Using
ERISA, the Tax Code, and Bankruptcy to Evade Their Pension Obligations, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
1577 (2004).
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survivor. The very act of consenting, however, shows that the benefit is
not accrued. Once a benefit accrues it becomes non-forfeitable for the plan
and inalienable for the participant/beneficiary. If the QPSA benefits
accrued to the survivor then he would not be able to waive his right to the
annuities the way he can under current law. In fact, whenever a participant
elects a lump sum, any surviving spouse must also consent to the lump sum
and waive any right to the QPSA. If the benefit was of the accrued variety,
this waiver would be illegal and the participant would not be allowed to
elect a lump sum.
An even simpler logical argument is that the QPSA, by its very nature,
is not accrued because it is designed to expire upon reaching a contingency,
namely the annuity start date, presumably at age 65, or perhaps earlier
depending upon the plan.'75 Once the participant reaches the annuity start
date and begins receiving payments, the QPSA disappears and is replaced
with the QJSA, which a survivor can waive in the event of a lump sum
distribution. 76 The QPSA is designed to provide a simple mechanism for a
survivor to receive the accrued benefit of the participant in the event of a
preretirement death, and the QPSA itself is not an accrued benefit.
There is also one other important place to search for an answer to the
accrued benefit question: the Code itself. Treasury Regulation 1.411 (a)-
7(a)(1)(ii) states, "In general, the term 'accrued benefits' refers only to
pension or retirement benefits. Consequently, accrued benefits do not
include ancillary benefits not directly related to retirement benefits such as
... incidental death benefits ....,,7 If incidental death benefits include
QPSAs, then it should be clear that the QPSA is not an accrued benefit.
QPSAs, by their nature, are designed to provide death benefits, and are
incidental in that they merely provide for the payout of benefits upon a
certain contingency's occurrence, i.e., the death of the participant, and have
nothing to do with benefit accrual or normal payout options.
Mortality benefits like QPSAs and QJSAs are also distinguishable
from other "forms of benefit" that are protected much like accrued benefits.
For example, the ability to choose a lump sum distribution is a protected
form of benefit that, once given, cannot be taken away. 7s QPSAs and
QJSAs are legislatively mandated and cannot be removed by plan
175. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-20 Q&A 10 (2006).
176. See supra text accompanying note 66.
177. See Treas. Reg. § 1.411 (a)-7(a)(1)(ii) (2005). See also Barker & O'Brien, supra
note 2, at 22 ("The Treasury regulations, however, say that the 'accrued benefit' does not
include 'incidental' death benefits.").
178. ERISA § 204(g)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
However, a lump sum option can be discontinued for service arising after the plan
amendment. This is the general rule for optional benefit forms; pre-amendment service still
gets the optional benefit and post-amendment service does not. See LANGBEIN, supra note
23, at 175.
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amendment. However, they are different in that mortality benefits can
expire or be waived by the beneficiary. Mortality benefits are also
distinguishable from benefit components like cost-of-living adjustments
(COLAs). 79 In Hickey v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse
Workers Union, the Seventh Circuit held that a plan-mandated COLA is a
protected accrued benefit. 80 The Hickey court relied heavily on the lower
court's decision in Shaw v. Int'l Ass 'n of Machinists for their reasoning. 8'
In Shaw, the plaintiff was a retiree of the International Association of
Machinists Union. 82 The plan had amended away a COLA it referred to as
a "living pension." The plaintiffs argument rested on the idea that "an
accrued benefit may be expressed in the form of a formula."' 83
Accordingly, the formula in the plan included the "living pension" and
therefore was an accrued benefit along with the main retirement benefit.
The Shaw court agreed with the plaintiff, holding that "the living pension
feature was an integral part of the formula through which the plaintiffs
accrued benefits were expressed."'
8 4
Mortality benefits, alternatively, are not an integral part of the benefit
formula. The mortality benefits mandated by ERISA are simply alternative
payout methods implicated only upon the death of the participant who
earned the benefits. Once the participant has started receiving the
payments, the QPSA disappears. A QJSA is only implicated if the
participant dies before his beneficiary. If the participant elects a lump sum,
all of the mortality benefits disappear. Although QPSAs and QJSAs are
necessarily included in the plan documents for each defined benefit plan,
they do not have the characteristics that protect benefit formulas and even
ancillary items like optional benefit forms.
After the above discussion, it should be clear that the mortality
benefits ERISA mandates, in defined benefit plans, are not accrued
benefits. A participant has no accrued interest in a benefit that only pays
out if he dies, and the survivor-beneficiary has no accrued interest in a
benefit that can be waived or that will expire upon the occurrence of a
contingency. Mortality benefits fail the accrued benefit tests of the Anti-
alienation and Non-forfeiture Rule. They also fail because the Regulations
179. A cost-of-living adjustment is designed to help retirees maintain their standard of
living by tying their yearly benefit to factors like salary increases or inflation. Shaw v. Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Pension Plan, 563 F. Supp. 653 (C.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd, 750 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1985).
180. Hickey v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union, 980
F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1992).
181. Id. at 468.
182. Shaw, 563 F. Supp. at 654.
183. Id. at 655 (emphasis omitted).
184. Id. at 656.
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are explicit in the statement that only direct pension or retirement benefits
constitute an accrued benefit.
IV. THE FINAL CASE FOR THE MORTALITY DISCOUNT
Barker and O'Brien posited one of the best phrasings of the mortality
discount question in their critique of Berger:
May a plan reduce the pre-age 65 benefit payout to reflect the
value to the participant that, without the early payout, death
before age 65 might possibly cause the participant to forego it, if
the plan provides a death benefit to the survivors of a participant
who dies before age 65?185
A lay version of the question might be: when calculating a lump sum
payment to terminated employees, may a plan reduce the payment based on
the value of the ERISA-required qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity
because a survivor's receipt of the annuity is conditional upon the
participant actually leaving the money in the account until reaching age 65?
As noted above, Berger is not helpful in determining whether the pre-
retirement death benefit is an accrued benefit, and looking elsewhere for
guidance also avails little. The court in Esden mentioned mortality but
declined to discuss it as an issue because neither party raised it in their
arguments. 8 6 The best place to look for further guidance on the mortality
discount issue will be the language of the Internal Revenue Code
concerning defined benefit plans and accrued benefits.
Cash balance plans are defined benefit plans for the purposes of
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code. As such, § 417(e) governs lump
sum distributions from cash balance plans. To restate, § 417(e)(3) says:
"the present value shall not be less than the present value calculated by
using the applicable mortality table and the applicable interest rate."'' 8 7 The
regulations further require the use of the mortality table: "A defined
benefit plan must provide that the present value of any accrued benefit and
the amount.., of any distribution, including a single sum, must not be less
than the amount calculated using the applicable interest rate . . . and the
applicable mortality table."' 8 In the context of defining benefit limitations
under § 415(b), the mortality table must also be used to correctly value
benefits for the purposes of the benefit limit under defined benefit plans.' 89
185. See Barker & O'Brien, supra note 2, at 7.
186. See Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 165 n.14 (2d Cir. 2000).
187. See I.R.C. § 417(e)(3)(A) (2000).
188. See Treas. Reg. 1.417(e)-l(d)(1) (2005).
189. I.R.C. § 415(b) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). Defined benefit plans are subject to strict
rules about how much a participant can receive in benefits per year, the violation of which
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Revenue rulings are another source for validation of the mortality
discount, even if that validation is by implication. Revenue Ruling 2001-
62 reiterates the general statement that defined benefit plans must use the
applicable mortality table in setting out the exact table that actuaries must
use in determining the value of lump sum distributions from defined benefit
plans. Mortality discounts are also mandated in the context of plans that
have employee contributions. For example, Revenue Ruling 89-60 requires
the use of a mortality assumption in valuing a single sum distribution upon
termination of employment even if employee contributions are an element
of the equation and governed by another section of the Code.' 90 It is
interesting that in most defined benefit plans employees have not
contributed their own dollars, but if they have, those dollars are also subject
to a mortality discount.
Beyond the direct statutory requirements concerning lump sum
valuation, the requirement of a mortality discount makes perfect sense
when one considers why mortality is a factor in valuing annuities. The
whole question revolves around the concept of forfeiture, which could be
stated better as the probability that: (a) a life annuitant outlives the age-65
value of his or her lump sum, thus resulting in the plan paying out a greater
amount of money than it would if the participant had elected a lump sum;
versus (b) a life annuitant dying before he or she outlives the value of his or
her lump sum, thus resulting in a forfeiture of the annuitant's assets to the
plan. This is a concern even though QPSAs and QJSAs allow another
person to collect payments in lieu of the original annuitant, because it is
still possible that a beneficiary collecting under a QPSA/QJSA will die
before the assets are exhausted.
A mortality factor is a direct representation of the risk that a person
will die before reaching some predetermined milestone, thus forfeiting
assets to the plan. If a participant elects a lump sum, that risk of forfeiture
has been effectively eliminated for the participant and his or her spouse
because the participant will immediately realize the actuarial equivalent of
the payments. For example, assume that a spouse predeceases a participant
who has elected an annuity. The spouse will not receive payments under
the QJSA once the participant dies because the spouse is already deceased.
Now, the only life to which the annuity payments would be tied is the life
of the participant, who would forfeit many assets to the plan if he died soon
after his spouse. After electing a lump sum there is no longer a risk of
forfeiture because the participant has the actuarial equivalent of all of those
payments in hand.
will disqualify the plan for tax purposes. For 2008, that limit is $185,000. I.R.S. Notice
2007-87, 2007-45 I.R.B. 966.
190. See Rev. Rul. 89-60, 1989-1 C.B. 700; see also Barker & O'Brien, supra note 2, at
23 (discussing Revenue Ruling 89-60 in the context of valuing lump sum distributions).
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Because a plan must make many assumptions about how long people
will live and thus how long they will be entitled to payments, the mortality
factor heavily affects how a plan must fund its obligations. It seems only
fair that plans should be able to take a discount from the lump sum because
participants have been able to effectively escape the forfeiture and
mortality risk, which as a matter of law, has already been factored into the
annuity payments.
One can also look to the legislative history of ERISA for another
argument to allow the mortality discount. As stated previously, Congress
passed ERISA to provide for "the continued well-being and security of
millions of employees and their dependents [who] are directly affected by
[retirement] plans."'' One way in which ERISA provides that security is
by demanding equal treatment for employees regardless of when or
whether they elect a lump sum distribution or whether that election is made
under a traditional defined benefit or a cash balance plan.' 92 This argument
is similar to the argument that Judge Posner found persuasive in Berger. In
Berger, Xerox Corporation provided an "incentive" in the form of an extra
1% interest credit to those employees who elected not to receive a lump
sum immediately, but to receive an annuity at age 65. In that case, Judge
Posner found the plaintiffs argument convincing, that this was an
inequality based on a choice that should have had nothing to do with the
actual amount received. The election to receive a lump sum, according to
Posner, should have had no further consequence than the decision to allow
the account to remain in the trust until age 65. In the mortality discount
area, FAP and other traditional defined benefit plans are specifically
permitted to take a mortality discount when a lump sum is chosen upon
separation of service. To allow cash balance plans, which are defined
benefit plans, to escape this cost merely because the benefits are displayed
differently is an inequality that ERISA's defined benefit statutes do not
permit. To reach that aim of equality, plans must be allowed to apply the
mortality discount. It should not matter whether the plan is FAP or cash
balance, the effect of choosing a lump sum upon separation should be
identical.
The most glaring argument against applying a mortality discount to
the present value lump sum calculation is that the IRS did not apply a
mortality discount in Notice 96-8, which is acknowledged as the only
guidance the IRS has released on the subject of cash balance plan lump
191. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2(a), 88
Stat. 829, 832 (1974).
192. See Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 34, 40 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (stating that it
is Congress's aim to ensure "to the fullest extent possible that participants who elected lump
sum distributions and participants who elected monthly benefits will be treated equally.").
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sum distributions.'93 Notice 96-8 is clear in its requirement of using the
"applicable interest rate" but the mortality discount is a notable omission.
Some critics have found that it is much more likely that this was merely an
oversight by the IRS, and not an IRS statement that mortality discounts are
not to be taken in this lump sum calculation.'94 One can argue however that
the IRS did explicitly uphold the requirements of § 417(e) in the context of
cash balance plans and thus, by implication, the mortality discount should
be taken regardless of an omission elsewhere.
Judge Posner's argument against applying a mortality discount is
weaker than the above argument and hinges upon a possible
misunderstanding of the Code. Judge Posner states that a mortality
discount "is unfathomable, since the plan provides that if the employee dies
before reaching retirement age his spouse or other designated beneficiary
steps into his shoes ... ."'9' This ignores the whole question of whether the
QPSA is an accrued benefit, and in fact seems to assume it is an accrued
benefit without any analysis. Judge Posner does not discuss such a
situation, like the previous example, where a spouse predeceases the
participant.
If the value of that QPSA or QJSA is an accrued benefit, where does it
go? The answer to this question is clear: the QPSA and QJSA are not
accrued benefits and a discount should be allowed for plans when they
value lump sums. Additionally, the designated beneficiary does not fully
step into the shoes of the participant. The beneficiary is entitled to a
benefit, but not the full benefit to which the participant was entitled. This
key distinction shows that it makes a difference whether the annuity is tied
to the life of the participant or the beneficiary. If the annuity is still tied to
the life of the participant, the benefits will be paid 100%. If the annuity is
tied to the life of the beneficiary, those payments are generally 50% of the
participant's benefit. There is a different cost associated and a different
cost for the lump sum distribution.
Part V will discuss "whipsaw" and mortality discount in light of the
new pension legislation passed in 2006. The above discussion of
"whipsaw" and mortality discount at the very least will be of assistance to
those courts and lawyers who are litigating lump sum distributions paid
prior to the passage of the PPA. However, it is also this Article's argument
193. Even in light of the PPA, discussed infra Part V, there is no definitive answer from
the judiciary or the legislature on whether a mortality discount applies to cash balance plans.
Because Notice 96-8 is arguably overruled under the PPA, I.R.C. § 417(e) is now the only
support one way or the other.
194. See Barker & O'Brien, supra note 2, at 23.
195. See Berger v. Xerox Corp. Ret. Income Guarantee Plan, 338 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir.
2003).
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that the mortality discount question has still not been answered, and that the
discount should still be taken even after the PPA is taken into account.
V. A PROBABLE SEA CHANGE IN CASH BALANCE PLAN LUMP SUM
DISTRIBUTIONS: THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006
On August 17, 2006, President George W. Bush signed the Pension
Protection Act of 2006196 into law. 197 In his remarks at that time, President
Bush referred to the Act as "the most sweeping reform of America's
pension laws in over 30 years. ' 98 The PPA made fundamental changes to
defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans, hybrid cash balance
plans, ERISA fiduciary law, and the PBGC.' 99 In regard to cash balance
plans, the PPA accomplished two objectives relevant to this Article: 1)
cash balance plans are recognized as legitimate, defined benefit plans; 200
and 2) employers are permitted to pay employees the amount of the
hypothetical account balance without violating vesting rules.20 1 These
changes were made prospectively, so any payments made before August
17, 2006, were subject to the prior cloudy rules from I.R.S. Notice 96-8 and
the Internal Revenue Code.20 2
Although it would seem that "whipsaw" and mortality discount
problems have been effectively solved and, therefore, that this Article is no
longer relevant, remember that, because relief from the PPA is prospective,
any matter pending litigation or new litigation arising from payments made
prior to the PPA enactment is subject to the judicial precedent of Berger,
Esden, and Lyons. This Article will help other circuit courts decide
whether a mortality discount should have been taken in lump sum
distributions. The accrued benefit question is still highly relevant, and I
argue in this Article that a mortality discount should be taken from lump
sum distributions subject to a "whipsaw" calculation.
Additionally, there are several alarming implications arising from the
manner in which Congress decided to solve the lump sum "whipsaw"
196. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006)
[hereinafter PPA].
197. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Signs H.R. 4, the
Pension Protection Act of 2006 (Aug. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060817-1.html.
198. Id.
199. See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, THE "PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006," AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE
ON JULY 28, 2006, AND AS CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE ON AUGUST 3, 2006, (Comm. Print
2006).
200. PPA § 701(a). See also ERISA § 203(f)(3).
201. PPA § 701(a). See also ERISA § 203(f)(1).
202. PPA § 701(e)(2).
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problem. First, Congress sidestepped the accrued benefit question in its
resolution of "whipsaw." Because a cash balance plan is a defined benefit
plan, it is subject to the same rules, requirements, and logic as other defined
benefit plans. While there is a plausible reading of the statute that will give
the PPA's language the desired effect, it is not entirely clear that this
interpretation coheres with other ERISA requirements. Second, the
changes to cash balance plans make them appear even more like defined
contribution plans than before. One might question whether, as a public
policy matter, cash balance plans should still be subject to the same
requirements as defined benefit plans.
A. Pension Protection Act of 2006 Authorizes Cash Balance Plans
The most important aspect of PPA treatment of cash balance plans is
that it specifically allows cash balance plans to qualify as valid defined
benefit plans. Prior to the PPA, cash balance plans were not specifically
authorized in any congressional action, but were merely tolerated by the
IRS. Now it seems Congress has provided a definitive recognition of cash
balance plans as permissible and not age discriminatory.2 °3 Congress did
not discuss "cash balance" plans per se, but did create rules designed to
govern "applicable defined benefit" plans that utilize a "hypothetical
account" for the purposes of benefit accrual.2°4  Therefore, it seems
Congress did not create a third class of retirement plan, but merely allowed
the cash balance plan to take its place in the pantheon of defined benefit
plans. Although there are still some questions regarding how effective
Congress's measures will be, the Act does clear up some of the confusion
that has surrounded cash balance plans since their inception in the 1980's.
B. Pension Protection Act of 2006 Abolishes "Whipsaw"
Section 701(a)(2) of PPA modifies ERISA § 203, adding a new
subsection that specifically discusses the accrued benefit under a cash
balance plan.20 5 Under new ERISA § 203(f), an "applicable defined benefit
203. Cash balance plans have most often been attacked on the basis of age
discrimination. This aspect of cash balance plans has not been discussed in this Article
because it is unrelated to the question of lump sum distributions. Several PPA provisions
would seem prima facie to affect accrued benefits and plan amendments, but upon further
review these rules are applicable only for age discrimination and plan conversion purposes.
For further discussion of cash balance plans and age discrimination, see generally Richard
Shea, Michael Francese and Robert Newman, Age Discrimination in Cash Balance Plans:
Another View, 19 VA. TAX. REv. 763 (2000).
204. See PPA § 701(a)(2) (creating new ERISA § 203(f)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. §
1053(f)(3)(A)).
205. Id.
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plan '' 2°6 is not treated as failing to meet certain benefit accrual or vesting
requirements "solely because the present value of the accrued benefit (or
any portion thereof) of any participant is, under the terms of the plan, equal
to the amount expressed as the balance in the hypothetical account ....
The main point is that lump sums can be paid in an amount equal to the
hypothetical account balance, eliminating the whipsaw calculation and the
need for a mortality discount.2 °8  Currently, this is the interpretation
Congress and employee benefits lawyers have adopted2 9  and,
consequently, it is likely to gain popular acceptance. Although it is not
explicitly stated in the PPA, it seems Congress intends to simply allow
plans to distribute the amount in the hypothetical account balances as lump
sum distributions.
There is, however, another interpretation of Congress's language that
might concern plan managers.2 10 Congress stated that a cash balance plan
is not disqualified "solely because the present value of the accrued benefit
is ... equal to the amount" of the hypothetical account balance.2 ' Perhaps
there are other reasons within the accrued benefit analysis that would
disqualify a plan. According to ERISA's definition, an employee's accrued
benefit is the individual's accrued benefit "expressed in the form of an
206. An "applicable defined benefit plan" is defined in new ERISA § 203(f)(3)(A) as "a
defined benefit plan under which the accrued benefit (or any portion thereof) is calculated as
the balance of a hypothetical account maintained for the participant or as an accumulated
percentage of the participant's final average compensation." PPA § 701(a)(2). Thus, an
applicable defined benefit plan is essentially a cash balance plan.
207. Id. (citing new ERISA § 203(f)(1)(B)).
208. If a company can simply cut a check for the amount in the hypothetical account
balance without engaging a "whipsaw" calculation, the company is effectively avoiding the
requirements of ERISA § 206(g)(3), which states that the present value "shall not be less
than the present value calculated by using the applicable mortality table and the applicable
interest rate." ERISA § 206(g)(3). Based on the PPA's language, this is the most likely
interpretation.
209. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 199, at 154 ("In calculating
the accrued benefit, the benefit may ... be calculated as . . . the balance of a hypothetical
account .... ). See also DELOITTE, SECURING RETIREMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PENSION
PROTECTION ACT OF 2006 19-20 (2006) ("For distributions after the date of enactment, no
distribution in excess of a participant's hypothetical account balance is required."); GROOM
LAW GROUP, SUMMARY COMPARISON OF CURRENT LAW AND THE PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF
THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006: MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION FUNDING REFORMS 31
(2006).
210. The following discussion is hypothetical and, admittedly, unlikely to be accepted by
any court. It is posited here merely for discussion and exploration of the terms of the PPA
and its amendment of the ERISA accrued benefit rules.
211. PPA § 701(a)(2) (emphasis added). Several provisions of PPA § 70 1(a) discuss
accrued benefits and interest credits, but only in the context of satisfying age discrimination
benefit accrual rules in defined benefits plans that convert to cash balance plans.
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annual benefit commencing at normal retirement age . ,,2 12 This
requirement has been judicially interpreted to mean that the accrued benefit
at any given time is equal to what the employee would receive if he got his
accrued benefit as an annuity commencing at age 65.213 This definition is
what caused the "whipsaw" problem in the first place. Assuming this
definition is still valid, which it likely is considering Congress has not
altered it, then the amount in the hypothetical account would still be
expressed as an age 65 annuity, and a present value calculated.21 4 This
interpretation does not seem to eliminate "whipsaw" entirely. Congress,
however, would argue that PPA terms allow plans to ignore the age 65
annuity requirements under ERISA by allowing the plan to have the
accrued benefit equal to the account balance.
It is also interesting that Congress uses the term "present value" in its
language. Based on Congress's usage of the phrase, Congress might
merely allow for the present value of the amount in the hypothetical
account, expressed in terms of an age 65 annuity, to equal the amount in
the hypothetical account, not necessarily mandate that the amounts be
equal. If Congress desired to eliminate "whipsaw" and say that the accrued
benefit is the hypothetical account balance, then it is curious that they did
not explicitly expand the ERISA definition of the accrued benefit to reflect
this idea. Under this alternative interpretation, the "whipsaw" calculation
could still be made, but the negative effects are stripped away.
To illustrate, recall the earlier example, in which Brent's $24,000
current hypothetical account balance was whipsawed to a current lump sum
distribution of $25,927.29 because the plan interest rate was 5% and the
applicable interest rate for discounting purposes was 4.73%.2I5 Under this
interpretation of the PPA, a possible explanation for Congress's language
and the Joint Committee's intent is that Congress intended to permit the
plan to ignore the applicable interest rate and to use the plan's normal
rate.216 This would result in Brent's receiving a lump sum distribution of
212. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. 93-406, §
3(23)(A), 88 Stat. 829, 836 (1974).
213. Berger v. Xerox Corp. Ret. Income Guarantee Plan, 338 F.3d 755, 758 (7th Cir.
2003).
214. One might also assume that by using the term "present value" in the PPA, Congress
meant something along the lines of "the amount in the account today." This ignores both
the financial definition of present value as the amount of future dollars expressed in terms of
today's dollar, and the ERISA definition of present value that requires a defined benefit plan
to take interest and mortality into account when discounting an age 65 annuity. It would be
irresponsible for Congress to use "present value" to mean "the amount in the account today"
because this term has a solidified alternate meaning as a financial term of art.
215. See supra, notes 161-167 and accompanying text.
216. Because the PPA is so new, there are no judicial decisions that support any specific
interpretation. To date, even Congress is silent on this issue.
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$24,000 because the two identical interest rates cancel each other out. 2 17
However, it is unlikely that this interpretation would carry the day in court,
because Congress's intent seems clear, regardless of the indirect manner in
which Congress went about avoiding the standard accrued benefit rules. It
is much more likely that the PPA language allows plans to insert a clause
into their cash balance plan that states something simple like, "the current
balance of the hypothetical account will be the present value of the
participant's age 65 retirement benefit for lump sum distribution purposes."
Congress's language was probably designed to permit cash balance
plans to limit accrued benefits, via the benefit accrual terms in the plan
documents, to only the amount in the account and the interest credited to
the account at the date of separation. Although it is odd that Congress did
not state this explicitly, it does seem that this interpretation achieves
Congress's intent to allow plans to pay only the account balance. This
interpretation would also serve as an effective overruling of Berger and its
family of cases. Of additional importance, is that the interpretation would
seem to allow Berger and Notice 96-8 to govern plans that were in
existence at the time of PPA's passage. This would be because the future
interest credits are part of the benefit formula and are an accrued benefit
under Berger; plans can only be amended prospectively to deal with future
plan years.21 8  For these reasons, this seems to be the most likely
interpretation.
Finally, because the term "present value" still implicates ERISA §
205(g)(3) and its inherent calculation," 9 which involves using the
applicable interest rates and mortality tables, a mortality discount could
arguably still be taken. A mortality discount clearly favors the plan, and
the "solely" language in PPA might be enough to allow plans to take the
mortality discount regardless of whether "whipsaw" still exists. Mortality
benefits still represent a cost to the employer providing them, which adds
support for allowing a mortality discount. If a mortality discount is
authorized, the employee could receive less than the amount in his
hypothetical account balance, thus adhering to the accrued benefit rules.
PPA does not specifically allow for this, but it does not disallow it either.
Furthermore, the same I.R.C. § 417(e) analysis used earlier could allow for
mortality discounts.22°
217. If the $24,000 is projected to its age 65 value at 5%, and then discounted back at
5%, the employee would receive exactly $24,000.
218. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1107, 120 Stat. 780, 1063
(2006). The Act allows for plan amendments to be made to meet the requirements of the
Act. Amendments must be made by December 31, 2009.
219. For this Article's discussion of ERISA § 205(g)(3) and I.R.C. § 417(e)(3), see supra
notes 109, 208, and accompanying text.
220. See id.
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PPA is silent on the use of the mortality tables with regard to cash
balance plans, but the Act does require the use of mortality tables for lump
sum distributions from defined benefit plans. 22' Because cash balance
plans are by definition defined benefit plans, they are subject to the general
defined benefit plan rules. Recall the earlier argument for why mortality
discounts should be taken on lump sum distributions.222 Preretirement
benefits like QPSAs and QJSAs are still forfeitable and thus not accrued
benefits. Lump sum distributions are still subject to I.R.C. § 417(e).22 3 In
fact, because Congress's solution to the "whipsaw" problem negates Notice
96-8's whipsaw requirements prospectively, yet is silent regarding
mortality discounts, it seems that I.R.C. § 417(e) is the only guidance to
which courts may look for answers. Thus, the pre-PPA rationale would
seem to apply to lump sum distributions post-PPA, which Congress may or
may not have intended. When employees begin receiving the amounts in
their hypothetical accounts as lump sum distributions and a mortality
discount is not taken, the employee is arguably being unjustly enriched for
the value of their pre- and post-retirement mortality benefits.
This reasoning is valid even if Congress's language is given the most
expansive interpretation, which is that the normal accrued benefit rules do
not apply to cash balance plan lump sum distributions. This idea also
hinges on the costs that plans incur by offering ERISA-mandated mortality
benefits. Congress's solution seems only to affect the "applicable interest
rate" part of I.R.C. § 417(e). The mortality discount should still be taken,
even if its calculation is made somewhat different because of more relaxed
accrued benefit formulas. Regardless, this is an issue that savvy plan
managers and lawyers should be aware of, and which judges should be
prepared to address in the future. Although the mortality discount is, in
pure dollar terms, not as dramatic as "whipsaw," when the discounts are
spread over large populations they do add up. In today's declining but still
expensive defined benefit world, the prospect of cost savings is music to a
plan manager's ears.
C. Cash Balance Plans Should Retain the Features of a Defined Benefit
Plan
As a matter of public policy, cash balance plans should not be altered
any further and should retain as many features of defined benefit plans as
possible. The "hybrid" nature of cash balance plans is more skewed toward
a defined contribution model than ever before. Defined benefit
221. See PPA § 302 (discussing the interest rate assumption for determining lump sum
distribution).
222. See supra Part IV.
223. See PPA § 302(b).
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characteristics possibly at risk include mortality benefits and funding
requirements. Because employers have great incentives to decrease the
cost of cash balance plans, the government and employee interest groups
should be wary of further changes to cash balance plan administration and
benefit accruals.
After the enactment of PPA in 2006, cash balance plans changed to
look even more like defined contribution plans than before, but with fewer
benefits accruing to participants than would accrue under a traditional
defined benefit plan.224 Because future interest credits are no longer part of
the accrued benefit, employers will achieve legitimate cost savings, since
the "whipsaw" effect will no longer exist. The "whipsaw" effect would not
have existed in the first place if plans were allowed to use identical interest
rates in the "whipsaw" calculation, so these cost savings seem fair. The
elimination of other benefits, however, would be unfair to participants and
would cause cash balance plans to drift even further from their official
classification as defined benefit plans. Mortality benefits, like QPSAs,
QJSAs, and the minimum funding requirements, are examples of
protections afforded to participants under the defined benefit model that
should not be relaxed or eliminated for cash balance plans.
Employer cost savings are the main force behind further revisions to
cash balance plans. Because the "career-employment" model has declined,
employers are clearly aware that fewer employees will remain with the
company until age 65 to receive their cash balance benefits as annuities.225
Most employees will leave their jobs at some point before retirement, and
research shows that employees are electing lump sum more than ever
before. 6 Employees receiving lump sum distributions may obtain them
tax-free only if they roll them over into a "rollover IRA., 227 This rollover
is the only incentive a separated employee has to reinvest his money into
retirement. This incentive is effective for some, but many employees do
not take advantage of it.22t  Therefore, it may be advisable to grant
224. Remember that the traditional defined benefit plan still must express itself as an age
65 annuity, while cash balance plans do not. Also, traditional plans still must calculate a
present value based on the age 65 annuity and the applicable interest rate and mortality
table. Cash balance plans arguably are not required to do so.
225. See LANGBErN, supra note 23, at 62.
226. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
227. I.R.C. § 402(c) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
228. See LANGBEIN, supra note 23, at 165 (noting that according to the 1998 Census
Bureau Report, "almost two-thirds of those who took [a lump sum distribution] cashed out
at least part of it rather than rolling it over."). Professor Langbein also noted that those who
spent rather than saved "tended to be the poorest and the least well-paid, that is, those whose
retirement income needs are likely to be the most acute." Id.
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additional incentives, even though the current tax incentives are costly
enough on their own.229
Defined benefit plans give employees greater protection for their
retirement income, but that protection does not come without a price.
Defined benefit plans are expensive, which is why new defined benefit
plans are rare, and terminated defined benefit plans are common. It is also
why companies funnel more retirement resources into inexpensive defined
contribution plans. Defined contribution plans are an important element of
retirement planning, but a 401(k) plan on its own is not enough to provide a
healthy retirement.
Note that if Congress decides that public policy should shift even
further towards the defined contribution model, then hybrid plans and
defined benefit plans will also have to change. Congress should step
carefully and be comprehensive when making these changes because the
defined benefit plan regime is so complex that every change affects some
other statute or bit of IRS guidance. The defined benefit regime has had
over thirty years to entrench itself, and a few words in a new piece of
legislation will likely be inadequate to completely alter the landscape.
Regardless of what Congress does or does not decide to do, it is my belief
that the defined benefit regime should have a place in the United States
retirement landscape, and that these plans can coexist with defined
contribution plans to help employees adequately provide for their
retirement.
Protecting retirement income will become more important to United
States citizens and to the government as the years pass. Making it easy for
companies to cut costs and for employees to receive retirement benefits
without any greater incentive to reinvest their money is an irresponsible
stance given the country's building retirement crisis. Accordingly, cash
balance plans should be encouraged, but not to the point where they lack
the defined benefit features that protect employees from themselves and
from the plan.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The issues surrounding cash balance plans have been contentious, and,
in most cases, the courts have not helped to change the situation. Because
of the PPA, one issue that appears to finally have been decided is that of
"whipsaw." The courts upheld "whipsaw" because they decided to show
deference to IRS Notice 96-8 and the requirements of the Code. Congress
229. Id. Currently, Congress has acted to deter not rolling over rather than encourage
individuals to roll over. I.R.C. § 72(t) requires a 10% excise tax on lump sum distributions
that are not rolled over into either a tax qualified plan at the employee's new employer, or
into a rollover IRA. I.R.C. § 72(t) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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appears to have decided to ignore the requirements of the Code and allow
cash balance plan managers to do the same. Regardless, while it may be
true that these laws were designed for traditional pension plans, and that the
code drafters did not take cash balance plans into account when writing
them, the fact remains that the pre-PPA state of the law is that "whipsaw"
is an essential element of the cash balance lump sum valuation and will still
be important for pre-PPA litigation.
Still, this Article is designed to illuminate the mortality discount
mandated under I.R.C. § 417(e). The Seventh Circuit in Berger held that
no mortality discount could be taken in the context of cash balance plans, a
result that, based upon analysis of the Code, regulations, and the policy of
mortality, seems incorrect. The PPA was also silent concerning the
mortality discount, an oversight which may result either in employees
legally receiving less in their lump sums than they had in their accounts, or
perhaps continuing to receive their lump sums without a mortality discount,
thus unjustly enriching them for the value of the mortality benefit. The
PPA, however, stated that it was permissible for the amount in the account
balance to be the accrued benefit; it did not say that the accrued benefit
could not be less than the balance. The Code and regulations specifically
mandate a mortality discount, and the policy behind mortality as a factor in
the valuation of annuities clearly shows that plans must be allowed to take
the mortality discount.
With cash balance plans covering millions of people and their
numbers increasing daily, allowing participants to continue to receive lump
sums without a mortality discount being taken is allowing them to abscond
with extra money that is not theirs. Over time, the extra money paid out by
cash balance plans will grow into millions of dollars. This is money that
will no longer be available to the plan to invest, thus making it more
difficult for plans to meet their obligations. This in turn will require greater
influxes of cash from the corporations that sponsor the plans. Because
more money must be infused into the plans, there is less money for the
corporation to either reinvest in retained earnings or disburse to their
investors as dividends.
The recommendation of this Article is simple: the Berger prohibition
of a mortality discount must be overturned for pre-PPA litigation, or at the
very least not followed by other circuits. The mortality discount is an
important issue for the massive corporations that sponsor and fund cash
balance plans, and who have early-terminating employees electing lump
sum distribution at an ever-increasing rate. The nature of our economy has
changed, with employees changing jobs more frequently than in any other
generation. The laws should not penalize corporations or employees for
making changes in employment prior to retirement; all employees must be
treated the same. This was one of the primary motivations behind ERISA,
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and allowing the mortality discount is an important way to bring about that
equality for all defined benefit plan participants.
